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"The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie-deliberate,
contrived and dishonest-but the myth-persistent, persuasive and
unrealistic."
-John F. Kennedy, commencement address, Yale University, New
Haven, Conn., June 11, 1962.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hostile tender offers have captured broad public attention. Almost every
businessman, business lawyer, and student of corporate law knows the basic
script. A bidder, often described pejoratively as a raider, makes a public tender
offer to purchase a controlling block of the stock of another corporation, known
as the target. Target management opposes the offer, but because board approval
is not necessary to complete a tender offer, the decision rests in the hands of
the target shareholders. If enough of the target shareholders tender, the bidder
gains control, and any remaining shareholders are cashed out in a merger between
the target and some other entity controlled by the bidder.
Hostile tender offers have generated a great deal of controversy. Critics
claim they are bad for employees, bad for the communities in which the target
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. B.S. 1978, Utah
State University; J.D. 1982, Harvard Law School; M.P.P. 1982, Harvard University.
Research for this Article was made possible by a Ross McCollum Summer Research Grant.
I am grateful to Harvey Perlman for helpful comments on an earlier draft. I also wish to thank
Todd Bice, University of Nebraska College of Law Class of 1991, for his research assistance.
Bradford in Journal of Corporation Law 15 (1989-1990). 
Copyright 1990, University of Iowa, College of Law. Used by permission.
The Journal of Corporation Law
corporation is located, bad for the target's debtholders, bad for the long-term
development of the economy, and even bad for the bidding firm.' This Article
focuses on the argument that hostile tender offers are bad for the constituency
affected most directly-the target shareholders.
Arguments that target shareholders are treated unfairly in takeovers are
popular and commonplace. 2 Martin Lipton, a well-known takeover lawyer, claims
that the two-tier tender offer is "designed to stampede shareholders into ten-
dering," penalizing unsophisticated shareholders.3 "[T]he special dynamics of a
tender offer are such that the decision of shareholders is almost always a foregone
conclusion-they will tender; therefore, it is misleading to speak of a free
shareholder choice at all."' The Delaware Supreme Court agrees that two-tier
tender offers "are a classic coercive measure designed to stampede shareholders
into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of
what they will receive at the back end of the transaction." ' A committee of
the National Association of Manufacturers terms such offers "inherently ex-
ploitative. ' ' 6 A.A. Sommer, a former commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), warns that all tender offers are coercive and unfair to target
shareholders, not just two-tier offers. 7 The United States Supreme Court posits
that some tender offers may unfairly coerce shareholders into tendering their
shares "even if they doubt the tender offer is in the corporation's best interest." 8
The arguments that target shareholders are mistreated or exploited in hostile
tender offers fall into four general categories. The first argument, the pure
coercion argument, 9 focuses on the blended price received by target shareholders.
1. For a critical review of each of these arguments, see Bradford, Protecting Shareholdersfrom Themselves? A Policy and Constitutional Review of a State Takeover Statute, 67 NEB. L.
REV. 459, 508-36 (1988).
2. The arguments that target shareholders are mistreated in hostile takeovers sometimes
sound like a scene from a spaghetti western. Bad Boone, the evil corporate raider, swaggers into
town and demands that the innocent shareholders of Target Corporation sell him their shares
for substantially more than the market price. The trembling, cowering shareholders are about to
tender spinelessly when the white-hatted, good-hearted Target Management gallops to the rescue.
"Coercive, unfair, unfairly coercive, coercively unfair," shout the benevolent Managers as they
strive mightily to protect their charges from the vile Bad Boone. Business leaders, lawyers, state
legislators, academics, and the media are called into the fight, but their meager might cannot
overcome the evil raider. The target shareholders grudgingly surrender their shares and crawl
away defeated and beaten, additional victims of the corporate takeover war.
3. Impact of Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1985) (testimony
of Martin Lipton, senior partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz of New York City).
4. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 113 (1979).
5. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985).
6. Impact of Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, supra note 3, at 911, 914 (Committee
on Corporate Finance, Management and Competition, National Association of Manufacturers,
Recommendations Regarding Hostile Takeovers for Control of Corporations).
7. Hostile Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1987) (written statement of A.A. Sommer of Morgan, Lewis
& Bockius); see also Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Note, Protecting
Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1964, 1966-67 (1984).
8. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 83 (1987).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 29-65.
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This blended price is the average of the tender offer price and the second tier
price, weighted by the proportion of stock purchased in each tier. If non-
tendering shareholders are cashed out in a merger, the second tier price is the
consideration paid in the merger. If non-tendering shareholders are not cashed
out, the second-tier value is the market price of the minority stock after the
takeover. The pure coercion argument contends that target shareholders lose
when the blended price is less than the pre-offer market price of the target
shares.
The second argument, the misvaluation argument,' 0 contends that share-
holders may be treated unfairly even when the blended price exceeds the pre-
offer market price because the pre-offer market price does not reflect the
"fundamental value" of the target company. A tender offer that appears to
offer a substantial premium may actually offer less than the fundamental value
of the target shareholders' investments.
The third argument, the heterogeneous valuation argument," assumes an
upward-sloping supply curve for target shares. This argument contends that,
even if the offeror offers a premium price that is both attractive and fair to
a majority of the target shareholders, there is no guarantee that the gains to
tendering shareholders exceed the losses to nontendering shareholders who place
a higher value on the target corporation. Even in the absence of coercion or
undervaluation at the margin, target shareholders as a group may suffer a net
loss.
The fourth and final argument, the bargaining argument, 2 claims that, even
if shareholders as a group receive a premium above the "fundamental" value
of their stock, they are not necessarily treated fairly because they could receive
an even higher premium with more effective bargaining. Structural problems in
the tender offer process prevent target shareholders from realizing all the potential
gains that they might receive.
The desire to protect target shareholders from alleged mistreatment in hostile
takeovers has spawned a number of proposed remedies. Martin Lipton argues
that the target's management should have unlimited discretion to block a hostile
offer because the target shareholders are unable to protect themselves." Professor
Lucian Bebchuk advocates restructuring the tender offer voting process.' 4 He
argues that separating the tender decision from the decision to approve the
tender offer will free target shareholders from the coercion which they currently
face.'" Professor Louis Lowenstein advocates lengthening the time the tender
offer must remain open, which would afford target shareholders more time to
decide whether to reject or accept the offer and increase the possibility of
competitive bids .16 These arguments for the protection of target shareholders
10. See infra text accompanying notes 66-127.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 128-86.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 187-205.
13. Lipton, supra note 4, at 114.
14. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers,
98 HARv. L. REV. 1693, 1747-64 (1985).
15. Id. at 1748, 1752-55.
16. Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 317-34 (1983).
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have been reflected in the recent rush by the states to enact takeover statutes.
Many states have adopted statutes limiting the voting rights of shares acquired
in the tender offer' 7 or limiting a successful bidder's options after the tender
offer."8 Such statutes are sometimes labelled "shareholder protection acts,"' 9 a
term previously characterized as a mischievous misnomer. 20
The myth of target shareholder mistreatment is intuitively plausible, as most
popular myths are. It is tempting to accept the four mistreatment arguments
without further examination; however, each argument either leaves out crucial
pieces of the puzzle, or is not supported by the empirical research on takeovers.
The structure of tender offers is somewhat coercive, but shareholders do not
suffer significantly from that structure. Legitimate instances of successful below-
market offers are non-existent. 2' The misvaluation argument is both theoretically
and empirically flawed, and situations when the bid is arguably below the
fundamental value of the shares are rare. 22 Target shareholders appear to gain
overall, even assuming an upward-sloping supply curve.23 It is impossible to
prove that there are no offers when heterogeneous valuation creates losses, but
the empirical evidence suggests that these offers are a rarity if they exist.24 The
bargaining argument also appears unsupported by the evidence. Target share-
holders capture almost all of the gains in takeovers, closely approximating the
negotiated solution. 25
A competitive market for corporate control and the bargaining leverage of
arbitrageurs and institutional shareholders adequately protect target shareholders.
A hostile bidder is constrained by the existence of other actual or potential
bidders for the target whose competitive bidding prevents any abnormally low
bids and, although driven by self-interested pursuit of a bargain, ensures that
target shareholders are fairly compensated. Even in the absence of a competitive
market, large target shareholders, such as arbitrageurs and institutions, inject
the elements of bargaining power and target shareholder control into the takeover
game, elements which the mistreatment arguments do not consider. These large
shareholders have the power to reject offers that do not fairly compensate target
shareholders.
In short, the perception that target shareholders are mistreated in hostile
takeovers is a fable, a fiction. 26 The suggested solutions to the target shareholder
problem are unnecessary or wasteful at best and counterproductive at worst. 27
Target management resistance to takeovers and strong state antitakeover statutes
17. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-11 (West 1988); see Booth, The
Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635, 1681-99 (1988).
18. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney
1986).
19. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2432 to 21-2453 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
20. Bradford, supra note 1, at 462.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 54-62.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 67-73.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 95-103.
24. Id.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 192-205.
26. Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stake-
holders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 439 (stating that "demonstrated examples of
coercion remain as rare as confirmed sightings of the Loch Ness Monster").
27. See infra text accompanying notes 302-19.
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provide no benefits to target shareholders and, in many cases, actually disad-
vantage them. 2s
II. THE PURE COERCION ARGUMENT
The pure coercion argument contends that target shareholders suffer harm
when the price they receive in a successful hostile tender offer is less than the
pre-offer market price of their shares; nevertheless, target shareholders are unable
to reject these offers because of their coercive nature. The theoretical under-
pinnings of the pure coercion argument are consistent with efficient capital
market theory, which argues that the market price of the target's shares is the
best estimate of the value of those shares. 29 If target shareholders receive less
than market value, they are not compensated for the market-determined worth
of their shares. They lose value. Although the theoretical basis of the pure
coercion argument is sound, the argument is unsupported by fact. Some tender
offers are coercive, but identifying successful tender offers when the blended
price is less than the pre-offer market price is almost impossible.
The pure coercion argument usually focuses on two-tier offers, when the
bidder offers a premium price for a controlling interest (usually fifty-one percent)
and then eliminates the remaining shareholders in a cashout merger at a lower
price. For example, assume that the pre-offer market price of the target stock
was $100 per share. The bidder offers to buy fifty-one percent of the target's
stock at a premium price of $110 per share and announces that, upon obtaining
control, he will cash out the remaining forty-nine percent of the shareholders
at $88 per share. No stock will be purchased by the bidder unless at least fifty-
one percent of the stock is tendered. The target shareholder's position in this
situation has been described as a prisoner's dilemma3° or a veto game. 3' The
individual decisions of most target shareholders to tender their shares will have
only a negligible effect on the success or failure of the tender offer.3 2 The large
number of target shareholders and the costs of organizing and enforcing a group
response makes a cooperative response unlikely." The dominant strategy for
each individual shareholder, therefore, is to tender whenever the first-tier price
exceeds the second-tier price no matter how low the average, blended price of
the offer.
28. Id.
29. For a review of efficient capital market theory, see R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 281-299 (3d ed. 1988); Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383 (1970).
30. Prentice, Front-End Loaded, Two-Tiered Tender Offers: An Examination of the Coun-
terproductive Effects of a Mighty Offensive Weapon, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 389, 396 (1988-
1989). For a general discussion of prisoners' dilemmas, see A. RAPOPORT & A. CHAMMAH,
PRISONER'S DILEMMA: A STUDY IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION (1965).
31. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
153, 189-91 (1986). For a general discussion of veto games, see Murnighan & Roth, Effects of
Group Size and Communication Availability on Coalition Bargaining in a Veto Game, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 92 (1980).
32. See, e.g., Leebron, supra note 31, at 184-91.
33. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 22-36, 53-66 (1971).
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The individual shareholder's decision is analyzed in Figure A.4 If the
34. For those who are more familiar with the classic prisoner's dilemma matrix, an individual














shareholder decides to tender and the offer fails, the shareholder keeps the
stock. Assume for present purposes that the market price falls back to the
pre-offer price of $100 per share." If the shareholder decides not to tender
and the offer fails, the result is the same; thus, whether or not the target
shareholder tenders is irrelevant if the offer ultimately fails.16 If the shareholder
tenders the stock and the offer succeeds, the shareholder receives either $110
per share or some pro rata blend of $110 per share and $88 per share depending
on how many shareholders tender.37 This blended price will always be higher
than the $88 per share received in the second-tier cashout if the shareholder
does not tender. Thus, rational shareholders would tender, regardless of the
probability of success, as long as the tender offer price exceeds the second-
tier price."a The offer will succeed even though the blended price in the example
35. It does not matter in evaluating the pure coercion argument whether, after an unsuc-
cessful tender offer, the price of the stock actually falls to its pre-offer level or remains at some
higher level. The implications of a higher post-offer price are discussed in evaluating the mis-
valuation argument. See infra text accompanying notes 66-127.
36. This conclusion depends on the assumption that the bidder does not purchase any
shares unless she gets the desired 51016 of the shares. If the bidder is willing to purchase all
tendered shares without any minimum tender condition, the balance is tipped even more in favor
of tendering. The shareholder would then receive $110 per share if she tendered and the offer
failed.
37. SEC rule 14d-8 requires that, if a tender offer is oversubscribed, the offeror must
purchase from all tendering shareholders on a pro rata basis according to the number of shares
tendered. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1989). Thus, if the target shareholders tendered a combined
total of more than 5107o of the stock, they would receive $110 for some of their shares in the
tender offer and $88 for the rest in the second-tier cashout. The exact proportion of tendering
shareholders' stock purchased in each tier and the average, blended price would depend on the
total proportion tendered.
38. This proposition can be proven mathematically. Assume the following variables:
T = Tender offer price
S = Second-tier price in cashout merger of minority shareholders
M = Pre-offer market price
p = Probability that the tender offer will succeed
(l-p) = Probability that the tender offer will fail
Make the same assumptions that are made in the text:
1. T > S (The tender offer price is greater than the price that will be paid in the
second-tier cashout merger).
2. p is independent of the individual shareholder's decision to tender.
To simplify the mathematics, assume further that, if the offer succeeds, 10006 of the
shareholders will tender so that each shareholder receives the lowest possible blended price. This
assumption is the least favorable to the coercion argument, The expected value of not tendering
is pS + (l-p)M. The expected value of tendering is p(0.51T + 0.49S) + (l-p)M. The proposition
to be proved is that
p(0.51T + 0.49S) + (l-p)M > pS + (1-p)M
Subtracting the common term from both sides of the equation yields:
p(0.51T + 0.49S) > pS
Simplifying:
0.51pT + 0.49pS > pS
Subtracting 0.49pS from each side yields:
0.51pT > 0.51pS
Dividing each side of the equation by the common factors (0.51p) yields:
T>S
Since this is true by assumption, the equation is proven. The expected value of tendering is
greater than the expected value of not tendering.
1990]
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is only $99.22 per share, less than the value of the shares if the shareholders
refused the offer. The problem is that shareholders cannot coordinate their
response in deciding whether to tender and therefore are unable to affect the
probability of success. 9 Because of this coordination problem, the offeror may
coerce the target shareholders into accepting less than market value for their
shares.
Front-end loaded, two-tier tender offers have never been the predominant
means of buying out a company and are even less prevalent today than in
the past.4 0 From 1982 to 1986, the number of two-tier offers declined from
eighteen percent of all bids to only three percent; 41 only six two-tier offers
were made in 1987.42 Most of those bids were not hostile. In 1985 and 1986,
only one successful two-tier offer was opposed throughout the contest, and it
was for a relatively small company.4 3 One scholar concludes that "the front-
end loaded, two-tiered tender offer ha[s] almost disappeared as an offensive
weapon in takeover battles." 44
Professor Bebchuk and others point out, however, that tender offers might
coerce unfairly even where there is no second-tier cashout .4  Once in control,
a successful bidder can divert a disproportionate amount of the target's profits
to itself, reducing the value of minority shares. Anticipation of a future cashout
might also decrease the market value of the minority's shares even if such a
cashout is not announced as part of the tender offer. The minority's share
39. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
40. Two-tier offers have waned as the availability of junk bond financing has increased;
this suggests that their primary function was not to coerce target shareholders but to help finance
larger takeovers when the offeror could not afford initially to buy 100%0 of the stock. Some
scholars have suggested that a two-tier structure of some sort is necessary to prevent target
shareholders from free-riding on the post-takeover efforts of the bidder. It is argued that, with
such free-riding, takeovers would never succeed. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Trans-
actions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 710-11 (1982). See generally Grossman & Hart, Takeover Bids, the
Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. EcoNomics 42 (1980).
41. Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1987) [hereinafter Regulating Hostile
Corporate Takeovers] (written statement of Charles C. Cox, Acting Chairman of the SEC).
42. Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 846, 847 (1989).
43. Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeovers, supra note 41, at 531 (Joseph Grundfest,
Two-Tier Tender Offers: A Mythectomy, Address to the United Shareholders Association Annual
Meeting, June 15, 1987).
44. Prentice, supra note 30, at 405. Professor Prentice attributes the decline of two-tier
offers to changes in SEC rules, the enactment of state takeover statutes, and recent cases which
allow target managements greater discretion in defending against two-tier offers. Id. at 405-25.
As mentioned above, the contemporaneous reduction in the number of two-tier offers and the
increase in the use of junk bond financing suggests that two-tier offers disappeared because a
better method of financing large takeovers was found. This suggests that, for the reasons presented
later (competition and the existence of large shareholders), their coercive effect never was great
and that they vanished as a superior method of financing appeared. See infra text accompanying
notes 206-57.
45. Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 911, 917-31 (1987) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender]; Bebchuk, supra note
14, at 1708-33; Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Ac-
quisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 678-81 (1984); see Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeovers,
supra note 41, at 279-81 (written statement of H. Brewster Atwater, Jr., Chairman of the Business
Roundtable Task Force on Corporate Responsibility).
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price could fall below the pre-offer market price. Thus, the acquirer's operation
of the firm with continued minority ownership could produce a lower second-
tier value as in a cashout merger.
In either case, whether it be a cashout merger or continued operation,
target shareholders clearly lose if the blended price is less than the pre-offer
market value of the company, which represents the value of the target under
the direction of existing management." In the example above, shareholders
would receive an average price of $99 per share compared to the $100 per
share they could have had selling their shares in the market prior to the tender
offer. Hostile offers fitting the pure coercion argument, however, are rare or
even non-existent. Professor Davis concludes that "the one issue in the takeover
debate that seems beyond dispute is that target shareholders benefit handsomely
from takeovers, at least in relation to the pre-offer value of their holdings."
47
On average, target shareholders receive substantial premiums over the pre-offer
market price even in the second tier of two-tier tender offers.4 1 In many two-
tier offers, the second-tier price is substantially the same as the tender offer
price. 49 When there is no second-tier transaction, the price of minority shares
also exceeds the pre-offer market price.50 It seems unlikely that a successful
bidder could divert enough value from the minority to justify the huge first-
tier premiums paid. Taking a tender offer price which is, on average, fifty to
sixty percent above the pre-offer market price5 and assuming a first-tier offer
for only fifty-one percent of the target's stock, the bidder would have to divert
over sixty percent of the value of the remaining shares before the blended
46. If one accepts the misvaluation argument, the value of the target under the direction
of existing management could be higher or lower than the pre-offer market price depending on
whether the stock is undervalued or overvalued. Even under the efficient market hypothesis, the
pre-offer market price may not reflect the value of the target under the direction of existing
management; it is only a ceiling for that value. In an efficient market, the pre-offer market price
should incorporate the probability that the target will be taken over by better management. For
example, assume that the target's value with existing management locked in is $90 per share but
investors feel that there is a 25% chance that better management will successfully offer $130 per
share. The expected value of this premium, $10, would be incorporated into the market price,
and the stock would trade at $100 per share.
47. Davis, Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988
Wis. L. REV. 491, 505 (1988).
48. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, THE ECONOMICS OF ANY-OR-ALL,
PARTIAL, AND Two-TIER TENDER OFFERS, at 17-19 (1985) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS] (finding blended premiums in two-tier tender offers in 1981-
1984 averaging over 50%). The study by the Office of the Chief Economist also provides data
on pure partial offers when there is no clean-up transaction closely following the execution of
the tender offer. Both bid and blended premiums are lower for such partial offers. Id. Only 31
such offers were made from 1981 to 1984, of which 13 were in 1981. Twelve of those 31 offers
were eventually negotiated with target management, so the number of hostile partial offers was
even smaller. Finally, non-negotiated partial offers on average did not result in the bidder receiving
majority control of the target. Id.
49. The SEC's Office of the Chief Economist found less than a 2007o difference between
the two tiers in 71% of all two-tier offers and an equal or higher second-tier price in 18% of
all two-tier offers. Id. at Table 8.
50. Professor Bradley found that, after a successful offer, the price of outstanding target
shares remained 3606 above the pre-offer market price. Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. BUSINESS 345, 360-65 (1980).
51. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS, supra note 48, at 17-19.
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price would be less than the pre-offer market price. Although fiduciary dutylaw tolerates some diversion of profits by a controlling shareholder, it is
unlikely to tolerate a diversion of this magnitude.5 2
A below-market blended premium is especially unlikely when minority
shareholders are cashed out after an offer. Any attempt to cash out the minority
at a price below the pre-offer market price would almost certainly run afoul
of the minority's appraisal rights." Thus, the pre-offer market price is likely
to set a floor for blended premiums when the second part of the transaction
is a cashout.
Offers that fit the pure coercion argument are almost impossible to find.
The Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC surveyed successful cash tender
offers executed in 1981-1984 and found that only 3 of 159 any-or-all offers
and I of 38 two-tier offers had negative-blended premiums.14 Comment and
Jarrell, working with the same data, found only one offer of any type with
a blended price which was less than the pre-offer market price.5 They indicated
that this single case, rather than being an actual below-market blended offer,
may have resulted from a methodological problem:
After negotiating for five months, National Semiconductor agreed
to acquire Data Terminal Systems in a tender offer for up to 58%
of the shares at $8.00 per share, followed by a cash merger at $7.25
per share. The offer was oversubscribed, with 73% tendering. One
month before the offer announcement, Data Terminal traded at$7.875 per share, giving a blended premium of -2.9%. The market
price one month prior may have increased because of an earlier
announcement of ongoing merger talks. This earlier announcement
was not treated as the "first" offer for purposes of calculating . . .
[the pre-offer price] . . . because no merger proposal was made.56
Pound; using a different measurement technique, reports premiums as low as
-10.5%.1 7 Although Pound does not report the number of offers with negative
52. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tacticsin Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 861-62 (1981).
53. Bebchuk, supra note 14, at 1709-10; Leebron, supra note 31, at 163 n.41.
54. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS, supra note 48, at Table 5.
55. Comment & Jarrell, Two-Tier and Negotiated Tender Offers: The Imprisonment of theFree-Riding Shareholder, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 298 Table 4 (1987). Robert Comment and Gregg
Jarrell conducted the SEC study; therefore, the data and methodology are similar. The only
visible difference between the data used in the two studies is that Comment and Jarrell look at
cash offers initiated in the January, 1981 to December, 1984 period whereas the SEC study looks
at offers actually executed during that same period. Compare id. at 291 with OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS, supra note 48, at 5. Comment and Jarrell do not discuss
whether this is the sole reason for the differences in the results.
56. Comment & Jarrell, supra note 55, at 299 n.7.
57. J. POUND, THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON TAKEOVER ACTIVITY: A QUAN-
TITATIVE ANALYSIS 10 (1985). Pound measures the percentage change in the market price of target
stock from 30 days before the first news of a takeover bid to the date on which the final, highest
bid was made. This should approximate the actual, blended premium if shareholders accurately
anticipate the second-tier value; however, Pound's premiums are likely to be lower than actual
value changes in some cases and higher in others. In some cases, particularly in contested offers,
the market price may be lower to discount for the possibility that the above-market offer will
not succeed. In such a case, Pound's calculations understate the premium if the offer succeeds.
In other cases, the market price may be higher on the date of the final bid because investors




premiums, he does list the ten targets that offered the lowest premiums, ranging
from -10.50 to 18.807.1B When Pound's methodology is applied to these ten
offers, only two involve negative premiums. One of those targets was Data
Terminal Systems, discussed by Comment and Jarrel; the other was Phone-
Mate, Inc. Asahi Corporation offered $2.75 per share for approximately 7.507o
of Phone-Mate's stock.59 The market price after the offer was $2.00 per share
compared to $2.125 one month prior to the offer; 60 thus, although Asahi
offered a premium over the market price, Pound's methodology classifies the
offer as a negative premium offer. There were other reasons for Phone-Mate's
stock decline, 6' and given the small size of the offer, these other effects probably
mask the effect of the offer. Two other studies show bid premiums as low
as 1.507o and 3.2607o, but do not calculate blended premiums.6 2 Thus, there is
almost no evidence to support the pure coercion argument.
The Data Terminal Systems case points to a more likely explanation of
the few negative-premium bids. The studies cited may overestimate the un-
affected pre-offer market price and, thus, underestimate premiums. Each of
these studies establishes the unaffected pre-offer price by looking twenty to
forty days prior to the announcement of the actual bid or merger proposal.
63
At that time, Schedule 13D filings, rumors of impending bids, announcements
by the target, and a number of other events could have already pushed up
the market price in anticipation of a takeover bid. For example, Holderness
and Sheehan report statistically significant positive abnormal returns associated
with Schedule 13D filings, particularly filings by so-called corporate raiders. 
6
If these other events occur early enough in relation to the bid, the initial
market price already reflects the possibility of a bid, and thus the calculated
premiums are too low. 65
III. THE MISVALUATION ARGUMENT
The misvaluation argument claims that tender offers may be coercive and
unfair to shareholders even if the second-tier price (or the market value of
58. Id. at 17. The 10 target companies were Chieftan Development, Data Terminal Systems,
Dorsey, Jewel Cos., Jonathan Logan, Midlands Energy, Phone-Mate, Superior Oil, Union Com-
merce Corp., and Vulcan.
59. See Asahi Offer for Phone-Mate Stock, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1984, at 38, col. 3.
60. Id.
61. See Price Wars and Overproduction Spur Shakeout in Phone-Making Industry, Wall
St. J., Aug. 2, 1984, at 10, col. 2.
62. Walkling & Long, Strategic Issues in Cash Tender Offers: Predicting Bid Premiums,
Probability of Success, and Target Management's Response, 4 MIDLAND J. CORP. FIN. 57, 58
(1986) (finding a 1.501o bid premium); Note, Second Generation State Takeover Statutes and
Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Study, 97 YALE L.J. 1193, 1220 Table 6 (1988) (noting a
3.26% bid premium).
63. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS, supra note 48, at 9 (twenty
days prior to announcement of initial offer); J. POUND, supra note 57, at 7 (thirty days prior
to first news of takeover bid); Comment & Jarrell, supra note 55, at 292-93 (twenty days prior
to announcement of initial offer); Note, supra note 62, at 1213 (forty days prior to announcement
of tender offer).
64. Holderness & Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial Investors,
14 J. FIN. EcoN. 555, 577 (1985).
65. Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence
Since 1980, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988, 49, 52-53 (1988).
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minority shares if there is no cashout) exceeds the pre-offer price. 66 Unlike
the pure coercion argument, the misvaluation argument is inconsistent with
efficient capital market theory. The misvaluation argument assumes that the
pre-offer stock market price undervalues the target's shares and, therefore,
presumes that the market is inefficient. If the market were efficient, the pre-
offer market price would reflect investors' estimates of the target's value under
the direction of existing management. Any offer in which the blended price
exceeded the pre-offer market price of the stock would represent a gain to
the target shareholders. This offer would be fair because shareholders would
receive a return in excess of their own collective valuation of the target.
Assume again that the pre-offer market price of the target's stock is $100
per share and that the bidder offers to buy fifty-one percent of the stock at
a price of $110 per share. The second-tier price is $102 per share. The blended
price is now approximately $106 per share, well above the original market
price. The misvaluation argument nonetheless claims that target shareholders
may lose because the true value of the target may be greater than the pre-
offer market price; thus, a positive blended premium does not assure target
shareholder gains.
The misvaluation argument is inconsistent with the general evidence sup-
porting stock market efficiency. There is no evidence that hostile bidders
consistently pick out undervalued companies and take advantage of target
shareholders. Even if they did, the premiums paid exceed the amount of
inefficiency supported by the strongest empirical evidence favoring the mis-
valuation argument. Finally, even if the fundamental value exceeds the blended
tender offer price in a few selected cases, target shareholders still gain from
hostile tender offers because such offers are the only systematic way for target
shareholders to realize that unrecognized value. 67
The proposition that the stock market is efficient is generally accepted by
financial economists. Fama wrote in 1970 that "the evidence in support of
the efficient markets model is extensive, and (somewhat uniquely in economics)
contradictory evidence is sparse." 6 Jensen concluded in 1978 that "no other
proposition in economics . . . has more solid empirical evidence supporting it
.... "69 Brealey and Myers recently wrote that "[tihe concept of an efficient
market is . . . remarkably well-supported by the facts." 70 In their examination
of market efficiency, Gordon and Kornhauser conclude that "[t]he pattern in
the market today appears to produce a very high level of market efficiency
66. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 307-08. For convenience, I will refer only to
the second-tier price. The analysis is equally valid in either case.
67. The only other methods that allow shareholders to realize the unrecognized fundamental
value are a restructuring of the target corporation or a friendly transaction. Each of these requires
the active cooperation of the target company's management. If management proposes such action,
then management effectively becomes a competing bidder, and shareholders can choose the more
favorable offer. If management rejects such action or does nothing, then the only alternative left
open to target shareholders is the hostile offer.
68. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FINANCE 383, 416 (1970).
69. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95,
95 (1978).
70. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 299 (3d ed. 1988).
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... ,"7 The idea that stock is priced at less than its true value is difficult
to accept as a matter of theory because of the possibility of arbitrage:
If there were significant divergences between price and value, inves-
tors could reap substantial gains by purchasing the undervalued shares
and selling the overvalued shares. This process of arbitrage would
continue until it became harder and harder to discover bargains; at
some point the cost of discovering the bargain would exceed the
trading gains that could be realized in the process. Once trading to
obtain bargains had occurred, the price of the stock embodies all
of the available information about the firm and its prospects.
72
Nevertheless, as Professor Kraakman points out, hostile bidders act as if they
believe the target is undervalued and often say that they believe the target is
undervalued; 73 therefore, the claim that target shares are undervalued needs
to be carefully examined.
The misvaluation argument states either that the market undervalues all
companies or certain classes of companies (systematic undervaluation) or that
the market has undervalued the particular target company (firm-specific
undervaluation). It is not clear that target shareholders lose in a case of systematic
undervaluation by the market even if the fundamental value of the corporation
is greater than the blended price of the tender offer. For instance, a possibility
of substitution exists because a shareholder who loses surplus when cashed
out of the target's stock can offset that loss by investing in another similarly
undervalued stock. The shareholder loses only the transaction cost of rein-
vesting. If there is persistent, systematic undervaluation, any loss associated
with the tender offer is offset by the surplus gained when the investment
originally was made.
There is scattered evidence that the stock market may not always be
efficient and that profitable trading on public information may be possible.
74
Much of this research is "of questionable validity," ' 75 but it nevertheless poses
an issue that must be addressed. A brief review of the market inefficiency
arguments shows that such inefficiency, if it exists, is too inconsequential to
explain the large takeover premiums paid to target shareholders. Further, there
is no evidence to suggest that any undervaluation which does exist correlates
with hostile takeovers. Bidders do not systematically pick out undervalued
targets; therefore, premiums paid to target shareholders do represent gains to
those shareholders rather than the recapture of market undervaluation.
71. Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research,
60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 792 (1985).
72. Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare,
36 Bus. LAW. 1733, 1734-35 (1981).
73. Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Price
as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 891, 910-11 (1988).
74. See generally Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 71, at 834-46 (summarizing studies
that confirm and reject the efficient market hypothesis); Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock
Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 341, 349-62 (summarizing studies that question
market efficiency).
75. Wang, supra note 74, at 366-75.
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The most commonly cited evidence of market inefficiency is the existence
of discounts for closed-end investment company shares and shares in dual
purpose funds.7 6 Since the assets of those funds are fungible shares with market
prices, the funds should trade at a price no less than the market values of
the securities they hold. The observed discounts are not necessarily inconsistent
with market efficiency. Agency costs, tax liabilities, and over-diversification
may explain some or all of the observed discounts. 77 The strongest argument
for present purposes is that inefficiency in the market for closed-end investment
companies or dual purpose fund shares provides no evidence that the market
for common stocks in publicly-held corporations is inefficient. Shares in closed-
end and dual purpose funds are marketed less actively than common stock in
public companies, and institutional ownership is lower.7 This market is less
likely to be efficient. The leading scholars who have examined these discounts
hypothesize that the discounts exist "because they are not supported by an
active marketing campaign." ' 79 Actually, the comparison to the prices of the
underlying securities held by these funds implicitly assumes that the underlying
prices are correct; otherwise, the comparison would be meaningless. These
studies therefore fail to show that the stock market misvalues the shares of
target shareholders.
A similar response can be made in the case of senior securities convertible
to common stock, which often sell at a discount from their conversion value
(the market value of the underlying common stock).8 0 The market for convertible
securities is thin with few professionals to engage in arbitrage.8" Some inef-
ficiency is to be expected in this market, but this inefficiency does not support
the contention that the market for common stocks is inefficient.8 2 Kraakman
presented similar evidence that the common stock of natural resource companies
and companies with large investments in marketable securities may be under-
valued, 3 but these discounts seem better explained by agency costs than by
market inefficiency.8 4
Professor Shiller argued that stock prices are too volatile to be justified
by changes in real dividends.' He concluded that the stock market must be
76. See id. at 377-86; Kraakman, supra note 73, at 902-05.
77. See Kraakman, supra note 73, at 903-05; see also Wang, supra note 74, at 389-90.
Both authors feel that these explanations are inadequate.
78. OFFICE OF ECONOMC ANALYSIS, SEC, THE POST-OFFERING PRICE PERFORMANCE OF
CLOSED-END FUNDS (1989); Malkiel & Firstenberg, A Winning Strategy for an Efficient Market,
4 J. PORTFOLIO MOMT. 20, 24 (Summer 1978).
79. Malkiel & Firstenberg, supra note 78, at 24; see also the authorities cited in Wang,
supra note 74, at 391 n.152. Malkiel now indicates that the discounts on these funds have largely
been eliminated because of more attention from investors. Malkiel, Is the Stock Market Efficient?,
243 SCIENCE 1313 (1989).
80. See Wang, supra note 74, at 377-86.
81. See id. at 386 n.138.
82. Even in the market for convertible senior securities, the percentage of clearly underpriced
securities is small. Id. at 381.
83. Kraakman, supra note 73, at 906-07.
84. See R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 624-25 (1986);
Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON.
REv. 326-28 (May 1986); Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, The Economics of Leveraged Takeovers, 65
WASH. U.L.Q. 163, 182 (1987).
85. Shiller, The Volatility of Stock Market Prices, 235 SCIENCE 33 (1987); Shiller, Do
Stock Market Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71
AM. EcON. REv. 421 (1981) [hereinafter Shiller, Market Prices Move].
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inefficient and thus overreacts to dividend information. 6 This work might be
viewed as evidence that stock prices have no real relation to fundamental
values. Yet, it is common practice for managers to try to smooth out dividends,
paying dividends at a relatively even pace despite a great variation in earnings.
A larger percentage of earnings is paid as dividends in lean years, a smaller
percentage in highly profitable years. Since investors are rationally more interested
in the variations of real earnings (cash flow), one would expect market prices
to vary with changes in the more volatile earnings. Thus, market prices should
be more volatile than dividends in an efficient market. In addition, scholars
have questioned Shiller's methodology.87
Studies reviewing market reaction to earnings performance show some
inefficiency, but not of a magnitude large enough to justify the takeover
premiums observed. Many studies show systematic excess returns in periods
following public announcements of earnings,8 but after correcting for meth-
odological problems, those abnormal returns are relatively small-no more than
one to two percent per quarter over a two quarter period.8 9 When transaction
costs are considered, ordinary investors could not earn any excess returns
trading on these inefficiencies. 90 Other studies that claim to find inefficiencies
in market reaction to public announcements also report cumulative abnormal
returns far too small to explain much of the observed takeover premiums. 9'
There is also some evidence which suggests that these inefficiencies were time-
related. 92 Wang, Gordon, and Kornhauser report several studies which indicate
that some analysts' recommendations, if followed, would produce above-normal
returns. 93 However, the magnitude of these inefficiencies, if they exist, is much
too small to explain takeover premiums.
All of these supposed market inefficiencies affect target shareholder returns
only if hostile bidders are somehow exploiting them and if the targets of hostile
bids are systematically undervalued; however, there is no evidence connecting
these market inefficiencies to hostile takeover bids. For example, it is often
argued that the market undervalues companies taking a long-term approach
through long-term planning, research, and development. Institutional investors
are claimed to have a short-term focus that discounts too steeply the potential
for any long-term gains; 94 however, the empirical evidence shows statistically
significant positive stock price reactions to new research and development
86. Shiller, Market Prices Move, supra note 85, at 434.
87. For summaries of the responses to Shiller's work, see Gordon & Kornhauser, supra
note 71, at 828 n.183; see also Wang, supra note 74, at 360 n.47.
88. See generally Ball, Anomalies in Relationships Between Securities' Yields and Yield-
Surrogates, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 103 (1978) (noting that numerous studies reveal consistent, excess
returns after public announcements of firms' earnings and setting forth alternative explanations
for this phenomena).
89. Watts, Systematic 'Abnormal' Returns After Quarterly Earnings Announcements, 6 J.
FiN. ECON. 127, 135-41 (1978).
90. Id. at 141.
91. See generally Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 71, at 843-45.
92. Id. at 843-45; Watts, supra note 89, at 142-43.
93. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 71, at 845-46; Wang, supra note 74, at 349-52.
94. See, e.g., Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987) (stating that institutional investors are driven to maximize profits in the
short term); Drucker, A Crisis of Capitalism, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1986, at 32, col. 1.
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programs. 9 Target firms have lower value-weighted research and development
to revenue ratios on the average, 96 and rather than institutional investors
shunning firms which make such investments, a positive correlation exists
between the level of institutional ownership and research and development
ratios .
97
Professor Pound compared the financial characteristics of hostile takeover
targets to a randomly selected control group. 98 He found no evidence supporting
the argument that target firms are undervalued in comparison to other firms
and concluded that "the data prove unequivocally that the myth of balance
sheet superiority among takeover targets is just that-a myth." 99 Takeover
targets had lower price to earnings ratios, but that finding is as consistent
with market reaction to agency costs as it is with market inefficiency. °0 No
significant differences existed between takeover targets and the control group
in price-sale ratios, price-book ratios, capital expenditure ratios, debt ratios,
return on equity, or earnings growth. 10' A substantial but statistically weak
difference in revenue growth existed. 0 2 Hostile targets had higher revenue
growth in the five years prior to the takeover, but this was matched by an
offsetting statistically insignificant difference in the opposite direction in earn-
ings growth. 103
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, on the other hand, found sharp differences
between the targets of hostile tender offers and other firms, but the differences
contradicted the predictions of the undervaluation thesis.'04 Their evidence
indicated that "hostile targets are older, poorly performing firms, possibly
with many old plants or equipment that should be abandoned or more profitably
deployed elsewhere."' 05 "They are growing slowly and have heavy debts." 1°6
Thus, no evidence indicates that any market misvaluation correlates with the
premiums paid to target shareholders. Hostile bidders are not able to pick out
undervalued targets and pay large premiums because of the undervaluation.
Summers, who believes that large valuation errors are theoretically possible
and consistent with the available empirical evidence, concedes that speculators,
presumably including hostile bidders, would be unable to identify undervalued
stocks and profit from that identification. 0 7 Even if the market persistently
95. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, TENDER OFFERS,
AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS 11 (1985) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC,
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP].
96. Id. at 9.
97. Id. at 6-7.
98. J. POUND, ARE TAKEOVER TARGETS UNDERVALUED? AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TARGET COMPANIES (Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc.,
Jan. 1986).
99. Id. at 24.
100. Id. at 12-13.
101. Id. at 13-25.
102. Id. at 28.
103. Id.
104. Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers,
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101, 102 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988).
105. Id. at 120.
106. Id. at 117.




misvalues common stock, the net returns to target shareholders would be
unaffected. Bidders will bid for both undervalued and overvalued stocks, and
the net premiums to target shareholders as a percentage of fundamental values
will be close to the premiums measured as a percentage of the pre-offer market
price.
The premiums paid to target shareholders might be justified by firm-
specific, rather than systematic, undervaluation. Firm-specific undervaluation
arises when a particular shareholder or the bidder has specialized knowledge
about the firm and its prospects that lead the shareholder or bidder to expect
different cash flows. This specialized knowledge might arise from the possession
of nonpublic information about the target firm, which would not be reflected
in the market price, or from a superior ability to analyze publicly available
information about the firm. The latter possibility is foreclosed by the results
of the market efficiency studies. In general, the market price of a company's
stock fully reflects publicly available information about the company. 108 Investors
with superior analytical ability are unable to outperform the market consistently,
especially when transaction costs are considered.' °9 Thus, on average, those
who value the target shares more highly because of a perceived analytical edge
are just as likely to be wrong as they are to be right. With tender offer prices
fifty percent above the market price, superior analytical ability provides an
inadequate explanation.
Nonpublic information might justify a higher valuation of the target than
the pre-offer market price. The strongest form of the market efficiency hy-
pothesis does not hold because those with access to nonpublic information can
earn abnormal returns. 10 The pre-offer price based on trading by ignorant
investors could be lower than the true value of the company if all information
were known; however, the nonpublic information would have to be substantial
to justify rejecting such large premiums. Further, a shareholder with nonpublic
information could protect himself from a below-valuation tender offer in many
cases simply by disclosing the nonpublic information so that others would
share the higher valuation. Absent coercion, the tender offer would then fail
unless it exceeded this common higher valuation, and shareholders would suffer
no loss. Finally, to the extent that such nonpublic information also existed at
the time the shares were purchased, any loss caused by the tender offer would
be offset by the gain received when the shares were originally purchased at
the lower market price. In short, the nonpublic information rationale seems
insufficient.
Professor Bebchuk argues that new information received by shareholders
during a bid might support a valuation exceeding the pre-offer market price."'
Market participants evaluate the target more thoroughly, the target management
108. See generally Fama, supra note 68.
109. See generally studies cited in R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 70, at 287 n.11;
Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 71, at 838-41.
110. See, e.g., Baesel & Stein, The Value of Information: Inferences from the Profitability
of Insider Trading, 14 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 553 (1981); Lorie & Niederhoffer,
Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 J.L. & ECON. 35 (1968).
111. Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender, supra note 45, at 928-31; Bebchuk, The Sole Owner
Standard for Takeover Policy, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 197, 205-06 (1988).
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discloses new plans and proposals, and investors draw inferences from the
making of the bid itself." 2 Target shareholders might increase their estimates
of the independent target's value based on this new information. Even though
the bid is at a premium above the pre-offer market price, it might actually
be below the shareholders' revised valuation. To support his thesis, Bebchuk
points to studies showing that the market price of target stock remains sig-
nificantly higher than the pre-offer market price even after a tender offer is
rejected." 3 Bebchuk offers this data as evidence that tender offers cause target
shareholders to revalue their company; otherwise, the stock should return to
its pre-offer level. The reason for the continued higher price appears to be
the expectation of a further bid for the company. If another bid is not made,
the price of the target stock generally returns to its pre-offer level within two
years" 14 or even sooner." 5 This is inconsistent with the misvaluation thesis,
which predicts that the higher price will persist.
Finally, it is difficult to envision revaluation during the course of the
offer of the magnitude that the misvaluation thesis would require. The average
blended price in a two-tier tender offer is more than fifty percent above the
pre-offer price."16 It is hard to imagine new information raising the value of
the target by that percentage even in isolated cases, and it is certainly unlikely
to be a common phenomenon." 7
Bebchuk suggests that the bidder might have nonpublic information about
the target."' He argues that "the shareholders might believe that the bidder's
112. Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender, supra note 45, at 928.
113. Id. at 929; see Bradley, supra note 50, at 368-72; Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale
Behind Interfirm Tender Offers, 11 J. FIN. EcON. 183, 184 (1983).
114. Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 113, at 205. Ruback similarly found that almost
all of the abnormal returns associated with unsuccessful tender offer bids had vanished after
three years. Ruback, Do Target Shareholders Lose in Unsuccessful Control Contests?, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 104, at 137. See also Easterbrook & Jarrell,
Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277, 290 (1984) (stating
that unsuccessful takeover targets traded at a 10-20% loss relative to market investment of proceeds
if the offer had been successful); Pound, Takeover Defeats Hurt Stockholders: A Reply to the
Kidder Peabody Study, 4 MIDLAND J. CORP. FIN. 33 (Summer 1986) (finding market-adjusted
returns of -30% in the two years following 56 unsuccessful hostile offers).
115. A followup to the Bradley, Desai, and Kim study looked at a sample of 21 failed
offers during the period from 1977 to 1983 and concluded that all positive post-announcement
returns had vanished by the time the offer was withdrawn and that no trace of the premium
reappeared in the following year. Fabozzi, A Note on Unsuccessful Tender Offers and Stockholder
Returns, 43 J. FINANCE 1275, 1282 (1988).
116. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS, supra note 48, at 17-19. Jarrell,
Brickley, and Netter report a follow-up study by the Office of the Chief Economist of tender
offers in 1985 and 1986 that found lower, blended premiums of 37% in 1985 and 33.6% in 1986.
See Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, supra note 65, at 52. They also report an unpublished study by
Jarrell and Poulsen that found overall premiums of 30% for successful tender offers in the period
from 1980 to 1985. Id. at 51. These lower figures would not significantly affect the conclusion
in the text.
117. Writing of management buyouts, Professor Lowenstein argues that, "while one should
be prepared at all times to believe in the venality of his fellow man, it is unlikely that corporate
executives have consistently hidden enough information and other tricks up their sleeves to justify
paying 50% to 100% over market for the stocks of widely followed companies." Lowenstein,
Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 730, 749 (1985).
118. Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender, supra note 45, at 928.
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motive for making the bid was the possession of private information that the
target's shares were undervalued by the market; and the shareholders might
conclude that the target's accurate value exceeds the offered acquisition price."9
But why would a hostile bidder possess private information that the target's
stock is undervalued? If this information exists, surely the target's management
also has access to it. They could release it publicly or to another bidder and
force the first bidder to pay a competitive price in an auction. 20 The situations
in which private information of undervaluation are most likely to exist are in
management buyouts or friendly transactions. Hostile bidders are unlikely to
have access to significant nonpublic information about targets.'
21
Some scholars circumvent the general conclusion that the stock market is
efficient by arguing that what appears to be a single market is actually two
different markets: a market for shares and the tender offer market for corporate
control. 2 2 The stock market price reflects what a marginal minority investor
would be willing to pay for the stream of dividends expected from the actions
of target management. It is not based on the value of the target's assets
because liquidation is not an option to the minority shareholder; thus, the
stock market price need not reflect the full value of the target's assets. The
tender offer price, on the other hand, reflects the value of the firm in the
hands of someone with majority control. Since liquidation is an option to a
successful bidder, the tender offer price should reflect the full value of the
target's assets. Two conclusions follow from this two markets hypothesis. First,
stock market efficiency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
the tender offer to be economically efficient. 2 1 Second, and more important
in this context, tender offer premiums above the stock market price may not
accurately reflect target shareholder gains since the assets they are giving up
may be worth more than the stock market price.
Even if the two markets hypothesis is correct, the tender offer appears
to be the only way for target shareholders to unlock these asset values, so
the premiums paid in takeovers still represent gains to them. 24 The alternative
is a continuation of the target corporation with the same stock price. The
argument then collapses into a form of the bargaining argument-how much
of the asset value do target shareholders capture and how much do bidders
keep as extraordinary returns? As the evidence below indicates, it appears that
most of this hidden asset value, if it exists, goes to the target shareholders.
This last point could be made with respect to all of the evidence of
undervaluation. Even if the stock market consistently undervalues target shares,
tender offer premiums may still represent target shareholder gains. The target
shareholders' alternatives must be considered. "An undervalued stock might
119. Id. at 930.
120. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 72, at 1735.
121. Kraakman, supra note 73, at 895.
122. See id. at 898-99; Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 274-75; Stout, The Unimportance of
Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 613, 687 (1988).
123. See Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of
the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1171 (1984).
124. See supra note 114.
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remain perpetually undervalued in an inefficient market .... ,,,21 If so, takeover
premiums clearly do represent gains over what target shareholders would have
if the takeover had not occured since they have no other way of realizing the
full value of their shares. 26 Target management might act to reduce discounts,
but even if possible, this is unlikely. "[Liarge redemptions of equity-the only
certain method of reducing discounts-will impose costs on managers, limit
corporate growth, and may appear to harm the long-term interests of share-
holders.' ' 27 Since the alternative for target shareholders, absent a takeover, is
the undervalued, discounted price, takeover premiums represent gains.
IV. THE HETEROGENEOUS VALUATION ARGUMENT
Professor Carney advances the heterogeneous valuation argument most
forcefully. 21 Professor Carney's argument for target shareholder losses in tender
offers does not depend on coercion or market inefficiency. 129 It can be used
even in situations in which a majority of the target shareholders want to tender
at the price offered. 30 Professor Carney focuses on the possibility of differential
valuations among target shareholders and argues that noncoerced tendering by
a majority of the target shareholders does not guarantee net shareholder gains.',
If the losses incurred by shareholders who value their shares above the tender
offer price exceed the gains realized by low-valuing, tendering shareholders,
target shareholders as a group suffer an overall loss if the tender offer suc-
ceeds. 3 2
Professor Carney notes that the market price of a stock reflects only the
valuations of the stock by those shareholders who choose to sell at the margin.'
He argues that the supply curve for target shares is upward-sloping; shareholders
who retain their shares at the market price value those shares more highly
than those who sell.3 4 A bidder desiring to obtain more than a small amount
of the target's shares must pay a premium large enough to exceed the individual
valuations of shareholders holding the percentage sought.
125. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 71, at 801.
126. As Professor Dennis writes,
[P]resumably the target's shareholders should be willing to take the bird in the hand,
a sure premium, rather than the potential two birds in the bush, the hope that the
irrational market gains its senses and that this produces increased value in excess
of the current premium plus the time value of money.
Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?, 19 GA. L. REV.
281, 317 (1985). See also Coffee, supra note 123, at 1171-72.
127. Kraakman, supra note 73, at 920-22.
128. See Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers:
The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 341, 354-57 [hereinafter Carney,
Shareholder Coordination Costs]; Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders,
and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69, 112-15 [hereinafter Carney, Fundamental
Corporate Changes].
129. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, supra note 128, at 354.
130. Id. at 355-56.
131. Id. at 353-54.
132. Id.




Assume that the supply curve for a target company's stock is as shown
in Figure B. The market price of the stock prior to the tender offer is M.
To tender for fifty-one percent of the target stock successfully, a bidder must
offer a price (M + P), which just exceeds the valuation of the shares by the
shareholder at the fifty-one percent level.' 35 Those shareholders whose valuation
is less than the tender offer price will tender, and the bidder will receive fifty-





Given an upward-sloping supply curve, overall gains to the target share-
holders are not measured by the percentage premium even if the market is
efficient at the margin. Two modifications are necessary to calculate the effect
of the offer on target shareholders. First, since not all tendering shareholders
value their shares at the pre-offer market price, the gain to tendering share-
holders is less than the simple product of the premium and the number of
shares sold. The net gain to tendering shareholders is the cross-hatched area
in Figure C' 36-the difference between each tendering shareholder's individual
valuation and the tender offer price. Second, the gain to tendering shareholders
must be offset by a corresponding loss of surplus to the remaining forty-nine
percent of the target shareholders, even assuming that they are immediately
cashed out at the tender offer price. Since the supply curve is upward-sloping,
their individual valuations exceed the tender offer price, and they suffer a loss
135. This assumes that price discrimination is impossible-all tendering shareholders must
be paid the same price. This assumption is consistent with the single-price requirement imposed
by the Williams Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (1989).
136. This gain, known as producer's surplus, is the sum of the differences between the
minimum prices at which each shareholder would be willing to sell and the tender offer price.
See generally D. MCCLOsKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 196-221 (2d. ed. 1985).
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equivalent to the area of the shaded triangle in Figure C.'" Given these two
qualifications, the existence of above-market premiums provides an insufficient
condition to guarantee that target shareholders gain from a takeover. Target
shareholders gain in the aggregate only if the area of the surplus triangle





Professor Carney offers several reasons why individual shareholders might
have substantially different valuations of the target shares-why the supply
curve might be upward-sloping. 3 ' First, he argues that the transaction costs
of shifting to another investment, including research and brokerage costs, might
vary among shareholders.' A shareholder expecting to incur higher reinvest-
ment costs might rationally conclude that the premium offered, less reinvestment
137. See id.
138. Some of the finance literature has focused on the elasticity of demand for stocks. See,
e.g., Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of
Information on Share Prices, 45 J. BuslNEss 179 (1972). The general conclusion of this work is
that demand is highly elastic-that different investors' valuations are relatively uniform. See
generally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 70, at 296-98. The theoretical reason for this
result is that shares are not unique. They represent a right to a particular income stream, and
alternative income streams (other securities) should be nearly perfect substitutes. Scholes, supra,
at 179, 181-82.
Carney argues that this research into the elasticity of the demand curve does not affect his
argument, which posits an inelastic supply curve. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, supra
note 128, at 354-56. Professor Carney's distinction does not hold on closer analysis. If investors
look upon securities as perfect substitutes when they buy shares and if the demand curve falls
within a narrow price range, they will also look upon securities as perfect substitutes when they
sell shares. A.slight increase in the price offered will prompt a large number of sellers because
those sellers know they could reinvest the proceeds in a perfect substitute and pocket the profit.
Thus, since the buyers and sellers are the same people, elastic demand does imply elastic supply.
139. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, supra note 128, at 356.
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costs, is less than the pre-offer target stock price. Given the size of the premiums
offered, this seems relatively trivial.
Second, Carney argues that tax differences might explain differing val-
uations.1 40 After-tax gains to shareholders willvary depending on the tax basis
of each shareholder's stock.1 41 Some shareholders might have purchased their
shares long ago at lower market prices or might have acquired their shares in
tax-free exchanges for other securities which had a low tax basis.,
4 2 Shareholders
who acquired their shares more recently for cash would have a higher tax
basis and thus lower tax costs when they sell to the tender offeror. Timing
considerations could also affect the tax cost. The presence or absence of other
taxable income in a particular year would affect shareholders' marginal tax
rates and hence their tax costs; however, tax considerations are unlikely to be
large enough to make shareholder reservation prices exceed the premiums
typically paid in takeovers. Assuming unrealistically, for illustration, that a
target shareholder had a zero basis in the target shares and a twenty-eight
percent marginal tax rate, any premium greater than thirty-nine percent would
still produce a gain.1 43 An SEC study found that seventy percent of any-or-
all offers and seventy-one percent of two-tier offers involved a blended premium
in excess of forty percent. 44 Thus, even with the unrealistic assumption that
some shareholders have a zero basis in their shares, not a single shareholder
would reject solely for tax reasons the premium offered in almost three-quarters
of all tender offers. Making a more realistic assumption about tax bases and
discounting any tax costs for their later time of payment, it is almost impossible
that tax costs would produce valuation differences sufficient to create overall
shareholder losses. 145 Further, if tax costs were high, the bidder could reduce
140. Id.; Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, supra note 128, at 115 n.186.
141. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, supra note 128, at 356.
142. Id.
143. With a zero basis, the entire tender offer price would be taxable income. The shareholder
would gain if the 72076 of the price received after taxes exceeds the original pre-offer price.
Solving for the tender price:
0.72 (Tender offer price) = (Pre-offer market price)
(Tender offer price) = (Pre-offer market price)
0.72
(Tender offer price) = 1.389 (Pre-offer market price)
Thus, even in the extreme case when the tax basis of the target shares is zero, the shareholder
would still gain after taxes if a 39% premium were received.
144. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS, supra note 48, at Table 5.
145. Assume, for example, that the market price has doubled since the shareholder bought
the stock; the tax basis in the stock is therefore one-half the pre-offer market price. Ignoring
differences in the timing of payments, the shareholder would gain if the tender offer price, less
the tax, exceeds the pre-offer market price. Assuming a 28076 marginal tax rate, the shareholder
breaks even when the following equation holds:
(Tender offer price) - .28 [(Tender offer price) - Basis) = (Pre-offer market price)
Simplifying,
.72 (Tender offer price) + .28 (Basis) = (Pre-offer market price)
Since the tax basis is one-half the pre-offer market price,
.72 (Tender offer price) + .28[.5 (Pre-offer market price)] = (Pre-offer market price)
.72 (Tender offer price) + .14 (Pre-offer market price) = (Pre-offer market price)
.72 (Tender offer price) = .86 (Pre-offer market price)
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them and make gains more likely by offering an exchange of stock in lieu of
cash. 1,6
Carney's third argument for a higher reservation price is that some share-holders might suffer from the externalities of a successful takeover. 147 For
example, a shareholder-employee might be terminated, or a shareholder might
face the costs associated with the closing of a local plant.' 4 The effect of
takeovers on employees and local communities is beyond the scope of thispaper, but the costs imposed appear to be relatively minor. 149 In any event,
these are not losses to target shareholders qua shareholders. The fact that a
shareholder is also an employee does not make the loss of the shareholder'sjob a shareholder loss any more than a firing of the shareholder-employee in
the absence of a takeover would be a shareholder loss. Community losses
associated with the closing of a local plant are not shareholder costs just as
the gains to the community where the plant relocates are not shareholder gains.
Fourth, Carney argues that some shareholders might have emotional ties
to the company which would make them reluctant to sell. 50 He gives as an
example shareholders who previously sold their business to the corporation for
stock. "'5 1 It is unclear why an emotional attachment would exist in such a case.Those shareholders have already sold the business once despite the emotional
ties. If they desire to maintain indirect ties with the business, they can use
the proceeds of the tender offer to buy stock in the bidder.
Fifth, Carney argues that shareholders who paid a higher price for their
stock, only to see its price drop (for example, those who bought a new issuein a bullish market), might be unwilling to recognize the loss that acceptance
of the tender offer would entail;1 2 however, this proposition is economically
irrational, as Carney apparently concedes.' The initial purchase price is a
sunk cost at the time of the tender offer, and the shareholder must choose
between the tender offer price and the value of the company under current
management. The original purchase price, however high, should not affect the
current valuation of the shares. In addition, this theory requires that the price
offered in the tender offer be less than the shareholder's initial purchase price.Given the size of average tender offer premiums, this is unlikely in most cases.
This argument seems rather narrow, and Carney admits that he suspects "the
majority of shareholders are not so attached to their shares.'""
(Tender offer price) = 1.194 (Pre-offer market price)
Thus, the shareholder would gain after taxes if a 19.507o premium over the pre-offer market price
were received. The required premium would be even smaller if tax payments are discounted back
to the time that the premium is received.
146. Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 165, 191 (1988).
147. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, supra note 128, at 356.
148. Id.
149. For a general discussion of the effect of takeovers on employees and the community,
see Bradford, supra note 1, at 529-34.







Carney concedes that "all of these are relatively trivial explanations of
differences between investors' valuations of the same securities."'' 5 According
to Carney, the most likely explanation for differences in reservation prices is
that investors have different expectations concerning the future performance
of the target company. 5 6 He offers two plausible explanations for why share-
holders might disagree with the market valuation of the target company. First,
investors might have "different preferences or expectations in the long run
versus the short run. 15 7 Even if the market price accurately incorporates the
future cash flows expected for the target, different investors might apply
different discount rates to those expected cash flows. These discount rate
differences could arise from differing personal needs, different investment
alternatives, age differences, and a variety of other causes. With different
discount rates, the present value to investors of the same stream of expected
cash flows would vary, and hence, individual valuations of the stock would
also vary.
This type of undervaluation argument fails for two reasons. First, it fails
to consider the possibility of substitution.5 8 If the market discount rate is
higher than that of an individual shareholder, it would be higher across the
range of possible investments and not just with respect to the price of the
target corporation's shares. A shareholder cashed out of his investment in the
target at a loss could take his proceeds and put them in some other investment
with similar cash flows and a similar market price. The loss from being cashed
out of the target corporation would be offset by a corresponding gain when
the shareholder acquired a substitute investment at a market price lower than
his own valuation.
The same conclusion results from viewing the shareholder's returns ex ante
rather than ex post. If the shareholder's individual discount rate remained
constant relative to the market discount rate, the shareholder also received a
bargain when the shareholder acquired the target shares because their valuation
exceeded the market price. This gain in surplus exactly offsets any loss incurred
with the tender offer cash-out. An investor would have a net loss only if the
investor's discount rate decreased drastically relative to the market rate after
the shareholder acquired the target shares. '9
Carney's second explanation for shareholder disagreement with the market
valuation is shareholders' perceptions that the market price is simply wrong-
that target shares are undervalued by the market.' 6° Whatever the discount
rate, shareholders determine the market is incorrect in its valuation of future
cash flows. This is simply a variation of the misvaluation argument with the
same problems noted in the earlier discussion of that argument.' 6'
Why do shareholders who value their shares at prices above the market
price, and especially those who value their shares above the tender offer price,
155. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, supra note 128, at 356.
156. Id.
157. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, supra note 128, at 81 n.41.
158. See generally Scholes, supra note 138, at 179.
159. If anything, the investor's discount rate should increase over time as the investor ages
and the relevant time horizons are shortened.
160. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, supra note 128, at 81 n:41.
161. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
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not purchase shares at the lower price? If such purchases were made prior to
the tender offer, the price would be bid up to the point at which a below-
value tender offer could not be made.162 Alternatively, higher-valuing share-
holders could make a competing tender offer in excess of the tender offer
price but lower than their own valuation. Carney's response to this objection
focuses on risk. 63 Holding more of the target stock would decrease the
diversification of the shareholders' portfolios, thus increasing the risk of their
portfolios. The benefit of buying more stock (the difference between their
individual valuations and the market price) may not exceed the cost to them
in terms of the additional risk assumed. Each shareholder would purchase only
to the extent that the marginal gain in valuation equals the marginal loss due
to increased risk, and this is not necessarily the same point that market price
equals individual valuation. The validity of Carney's response depends on both
the company-specific risk of the target stock and the individual shareholder's
risk-return tradeoff (how risk averse the shareholder is). For most publicly
traded companies, it is hard to imagine a shareholder so risk averse that a
market price more than fifty percent below the stock's individual valuation
would not prompt additional purchases. However, without further evidence of
risk-return tradeoffs, it is impossible to reject Carney's argument.
Professor Carney also argues that those who believe that the benefits
exceed the risk might not possess sufficient resources to raise the market price
to their private valuations. 64 He might also have pointed out that the strategy
of additional purchases does not work for some higher-valuing investors. For
example, shareholders who value their shares at a higher price because of a
low tax basis cannot correct that problem through additional market purchases.
Those who value their shares at a higher price because of inside, nonpublic
information cannot purchase additional shares without risking insider trading
liability.61 Thus, although market purchases by higher-valuing shareholders
partially solve the problem posed by Professor Carney, the solution is not
complete.
Individually, none of Carney's arguments sufficiently justifies a target
shareholder's rejection of the large premiums offered in tender offers. But
what if the factors are aggregated? What about the shareholder-employee with
access to significant nonpublic information who has a low tax basis, a low
discount rate, and higher than average transaction costs? These factors, ag-
gregated in a single shareholder, might justify a rational valuation higher than
some tender offer premiums, but the losses suffered by the occasional share-
holder who fits these criteria are likely to be small compared to the gains
realized by the vast majority of other shareholders. Thus, overall gains to
target shareholders in any given takeover would remain positive.
162. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 40, at 726-27.
163. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, supra note 128, at 356-57; Stout, supra note
122, at 688 n.373.
164. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, supra note 128, at 356-57.
165. The position of such investors is asymmetrical. The securities laws prohibit additional
purchases on the basis of undisclosed inside information, but do not prohibit these investors
from holding existing shares without disclosing inside information.
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Using the empirical research into tender offers, one can estimate the relative
magnitude of shareholder surplus and shareholder loss. Assume that, prior to
any action by the bidder, the target has one hundred outstanding shares trading
at a market price of $100 per share.6 6 Prior to making a tender offer, the
bidder purchases twelve percent of the target's stock in market purchases at
the market price.1 61 Given the assumption of an upwardly sloping supply curve,
these purchases will drive up the market price, but assume that the initial
sellers will receive no gain because of rumors of an impending takeover. In
other words, the market sellers capture no surplus above their initial reservation
prices. After completing the initial market purchases, the bidder announces a
tender offer for any or all of the target's remaining shares at a price of $155
per share, fifty-five percent above the pre-offer, pre-purchase price. 68 Sixty
percent of the target stock is tendered and purchased by the bidder, leaving
the bidder holding seventy-two percent of the target stock at the conclusion
of the offer. 69 The remaining shareholders are then immediately cashed out
at the same $155 per share price. 70
Two further assumptions are necessary. First, to test the heterogeneous
valuation argument independently of the coercion argument, assume that share-
holders were not coerced to tender. Second, for simplicity of analysis, assume
that the target shareholders' supply curve is a straight line. Every dollar change
in price produces the same change in the number of shares tendered no matter
where one is on the supply curve. The resulting supply curve is shown in
Figure D.
166. Neither of these numbers is crucial. One hundred is chosen as a starting point because
it makes it easier to work with the percentages given in the empirical studies.
167. The empirical studies indicate initial holdings by the bidder in the 9-12% range. See
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS, supra note 48, at Table 9 (finding 13%
for any-or-all offers); Bradley, Desai & Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and
Their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 6
(1988) [hereinafter Bradley, Desai & Kim, Synergistic Gains] (finding 9.8%); Bradley, Desai &
Kim, supra note 113, 188 (noting 12.81%); Comment & Jarrell, supra note 55 (finding 12.6%
for any-or-all offers).
168. The studies of bid premiums are more varied, but 55% seems relatively conservative.
Although Black and Grundfest observed an average premium of only 47.8%, Black & Grundfest,
Shareholder Gains from Takeovers and Restructurings Between 1981 and 1986: $162 Billion Is
a Lot of Money, 1 CONTINENTAL BANK J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 5 (1988), most studies indicate
a higher figure. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS, supra note
48, at Table 6 (noting a 59.6% bid premium for any-or-all offers); Herman & Lowenstein, The
Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers, KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE
HOSTILE TAKEOVER (J. Coffee, Jr., L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman, eds. 1988) (finding 80%);
Comment & Jarrell, supra note 55 (finding 57.4% bid premium for any-or-all offers).
169. Again, this is a relatively conservative estimate. The empirical studies indicate average
purchases of from 58.8% to 75.1%. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS,
supra note 48, at Table 9 (finding 73% in any-or-all offers); Bradley, Desai & Kim, Synergistic
Gains, supra note 167, at 6 (finding 60.4%); Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 113, at 188
(finding 58.8%); Comment & Jarrell, supra note 55, at 295 (finding 75.1% in any-or-all offers).
170. Although somewhat unrealistic, this assumption is made to limit the potential coercion
problem and to focus solely on the effect predicted by Carney. This assumption is relaxed later
in this Article.
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The surplus to the tendering shareholders is represented by the cross-hatched
portion of the graph. The loss to non-tendering shareholders is represented
by the shaded portion of the graph. Using simple geometry, one can calculate
that the gain is approximately $1375 and the loss is approximately $300, resulting
in an overall gain to all target shareholders of $1075.1 7 The average transaction,
based on figures provided by empirical studies, is therefore Kaldor-Hicks
171. The formula for the area of a right triangle is 1/2 its base times its height. The base
of the gains triangle is 60 (72-12), and the base of the loss triangle is 28 (100-72). We can
calculate the height of each triangle by estimating the slope of the supply curve:







Every one-unit change in quantity is associated with a 0.7638889-unit change in price. Thus, since
the horizontal quantity increase from point A to point B is 60, the vertical price increase must
be (60)(0.7638889) = 45.83333. Since the horizontal quantity increase from point B to point C
is 28, the vertical price increase must be (28)(0.7638889) = 21.39.
The overall shareholder gain (the area of the cross-hatched triangle) is then:
Gain = 0.5(60)(45.83333)
= 1374.99
The overall shareholder loss (the area of the shaded triangle) is:
Loss = 0.5(28)(21.39)
= 299.46
The net gain is the difference between these two figures.
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efficient, looking at the tender offer only from the viewpoint of target share-
holders. This conclusion holds even if one assumes a front-end loaded bid in
which the second-tier premium is lower than the bid premium. Assume that
the non-tendering shareholders are cashed out at a price of $140.1 72 This increases
the loss to nontendering shareholders to $720, but still leaves an overall gain
of $655.171
Carney argues that a straight-line model like this understates the losses
to high-valuing shareholders who do not tender.1 74 Carney argues that a more
realistic supply curve would slope more steeply upward as it approaches the
higher-valuing shareholders. 75 A supply curve that is discontinuous at the point
where the tender offer price intersects it approximates this change in slope.
(See Figure E.) One can then ask how steep the supply curve of nontendering
shareholders must be before the losses outweigh the gains in the average case.
FiGuRE E A
12 72 100 Shares
The gain to tendering shareholders, whose supply curve has a slope of ap-
172. The SEC study indicates that second-tier premiums average 44.8%. OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS, supra note 48, at Table 7.
173. The loss to non-tendering shareholders is now the shaded triangle in Figure D plus a
rectangle immediately below it 15 units high (155-140) and 28 units long (100-72). The area of
this rectangle is simply the product of its height and its length: 420.
174. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, supra note 128, at 114-15.
175. Id.
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proximately 0.764, is approximately $1375. For the losses of high-valuing
shareholders to exceed the gains of tendering shareholders, the slope of the
high-valuing shareholders' supply curve must exceed 3.51 . 76
The net gain to shareholders may be even greater than indicated above
because the assumption that the bidder can make market purchases without
any information leaks appears unrealistic. If information about the upcoming
takeover leaks before the market purchases are completed, shareholders selling
in the market will demand a premium equivalent to the expected tender offer
premium, discounted by the likelihood of failure. The initially selling share-
holders, given leaks, will themselves capture surplus, increasing the overall
shareholder gains.
The net gain is also likely to be even greater because the calculations
above assume that all shareholders who do not tender place a higher value
on the target shares than the tender offer price. In reality, there is evidence
that some shareholders take no action regardless of the bid. 177 Some of the
nontendering shareholders probably did so for these structural reasons and not
because they placed a higher value on the target. Also, some of the nontendering
shareholders may have refused to tender, not because they valued the stock
higher than the offer price, but because they wanted to encourage an even
higher bid or a competing offer, feeling that there was even more surplus to
capture and mistakenly believing that enough of their fellow shareholders would
also engage in this strategic behavior. 78 Non-tendering shareholders might also
attempt to maintain a minority interest in the target corporation and to enjoy
a free ride on gains expected from the bidder's operation of the target.
79
The fact that shareholders gain in the average transaction does not mean
that shareholders gain in all tender offers. Overall shareholder gains would
decrease under the model presented as the percentage of the bidder's initial
holdings increased, the blended premium decreased, and the amount of stock
176. The area of the shareholder loss triangle is:
Area = (0.5)(base)(height)
The base of the triangle has a length of 28 (100-72). To solve for height so that the area equals






Thus, for losses to exceed gains, the slope of the high-value supply curve must be:





177. Impact of Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, supra note 3, at 278 (statement of John Shad,
Chairman of the SEC).
178. Of course, this is inconsistent with the coercion model described earlier. See supra notes 29-
65 and accompanying text.
179. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 40, at 43.
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tendered decreased (as long as the bidder still acquired enough stock to gain
control). The SEC Office of the Chief Economist found that eleven percent
of any-or-all offers and sixteen percent of two-tier offers involve blended
premiums of less than twenty percent. 8 0 Of course, with a lower premium
and all else being equal, the amount tendered is likely to be less. Assume that
a bidder manages to acquire twenty percent of the target's stock in market
purchases before the takeover plan is discovered so that the price paid is
unaffected by the impending tender offer.' The bidder then offers a twenty
percent premium for any-or-all of the target stock and receives an additional
thirty percent, just enough to guarantee control.8 2 The tendering shareholders
have a total gain of $180, and the higher-valuing, nontendering shareholders
have a loss of $500, for an overall loss of $320. s3 Such a transaction is not
180. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDR OFFERS, supra note 48, at Table 5.
181. The bidder would have to file a Schedule 13D within 10 days of reaching the 5% ownership
level. Rule 13d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (1989). It is at least theoretically possible that the bidder
could acquire another 15% within that 10-day period, although it is difficult to imagine the market
remaining totally ignorant of the bidder's plans given purchases of such magnitude.
182. Actually, if we assume that the shareholders' supply curve has the same slope as calculated
above, 0.7638889, the bidder would acquire only 26% in the tender offer:




20 = 0.7638889(Change in quantity)
Change in quantity = 20
0.7638889
= 26.18
This Article will assume that the bidder gets the desired control and acquires 30% of the stock.
183. Graphically, this offer looks like this:
FiGuan F
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The slope of this supply curve is 20/50 = 0.4. Thus, the height of segment A is 30 x 0.4
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Kaldor-Hicks efficient;1 4 however, over seventy percent of any-or-all or two-
tier offers involve premiums in excess of forty percent, and a larger percentage
of offers have premiums greater than eighty percent than those having premiums
of less than twenty percent.8 5 Since we are dealing in percentages, the possibility
exists that small losses for big companies could dwarf large percentage premiums
in offers for small companies, but no evidence supports this possibility. It
appears that, on average, tender offers are Kaldor-Hicks efficient and result
in overall gains to target shareholders, even assuming an upward-sloping supply
curve.
On closer examination, Professor Carney's argument is not against tender
offers; it is against the long-standing notion of corporate governance by majority
rule. In Professor Carney's words,
[t]he long and painful development of the law of fundamental cor-
porate changes . . . has been designed to assure majority rule and
to provide methods for bringing the minority along or at least making
certain that they do not frustrate the desires of the majority. To
conclude that these transactions, accomplished over the objections
of some minority stockholders, have all of the benefits of freel I
bargained exchanges involves an unwarranted leap. 8 6
Professor Carney's argument, to the extent that it holds, is not limited
necessarily to fundamental changes to the corporation. An organized majority
with control of the board could make operational decisions that benefit the
majority at the expense of higher-valuing shareholders. Viewed in this light,
it is unclear that Professor Carney's thesis points to any prescriptions for
corporate takeover policy. If higher-valuing shareholders can suffer such losses
even in the absence of a takeover, the effect of the takeover is indeterminate.
One cannot know whether higher-valuing shareholders are better or worse off
than they would have been. Also, if such losses are likely, higher-valuing
shareholders should demand a risk premium when they purchase their shares
to compensate them for the expected takings by the minority. This risk premium
would fully compensate them ex ante for any losses they would expect to incur
in a takeover.
= 12. The height of segment B is 50 x 0.4 = 20.
The total gain to tendering shareholders is:
Total Gain (0.5)(30)(12)
= 180
The total loss to nontendering shareholders is:
Total Loss = (0.5)(50)(20)
= 500
The net loss to all shareholders is the difference between these two figures: 500 - 180 = 320.
184. A resource allocation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient "if, and only if, welfare gains on tendered
shares are not exceeded by welfare losses to shareholders on those shares subsequently taken by
merger." Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, supra note 128, at 344.
185. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS, supra note 48, at Table 5.
Twenty-four percent of any-or-all offers and 10% of two-tier offers had blended premiums in excess
of 80%.
186. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, supra note 128, at 110.
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V. THE BARGAINING ARGUMENT
Unlike the arguments presented so far, the bargaining argument does not
deny that tender offers produce net gains to target shareholders. The bargaining
argument recognizes that gains occur, but questions their allocation between
the hostile bidder and target shareholders." 7 The bidder wants to acquire the
target company to produce gains that result from synergy or the displacement
of inefficient target management. Even in an efficient market, the bidder can
offer a premium because the value of the target to the offeror is greater than
the discounted value of future earnings if the company is not sold. In the
words of Professor Leebron:
The sale value S can be viewed as a function of the acquisition
value A, . . . the value of the corporation in the hands of the
acquirer (or alternatively the maximum price an acquirer should be
willing to pay). The bidder presumably is willing to pay any amount
up to A, and the target corporation (or its shareholders) presumably
is willing to accept any amount greater than D [the discounted value
of future earnings if the target is not sold]. The difference between
A and D represents the gain arising from the acquisition. If all the
gains from the combination are paid as a premium to the shareholders
of the target, then S will be the same as A. If the gains are divided,
then S will be less than A and will depend on how the gains are
distributed between the acquiring and acquired corporations. If none
of the gains are allocated to the acquired corporation, then S will
be no greater than D, and the price of the shares of the corporation
will in effect reflect only their dividend value.' 8
The bargaining theorists do not claim that the existing investment of the target
shareholders is undervalued; they claim that "the market price does not reflect
value 'which may arise from the acquisition, and that the shareholders of the
acquired company are entitled to some, or perhaps even all, of that value."'8 9
Target shareholders might rationally want to reject a bid above their pre-offer
valuation of the target because they believe they could receive an even higher
bid either from the same bidder or a competing bidder.19° Unlike the sole
owner of a business who might negotiate for a better deal, they are hindered
by a collective action problem and the coercion inherent in tender offers.' 9'
Thus, the bargaining argument concludes that target shareholders receive less
for their shares than they might if they had the power to negotiate with the
bidder.
187. See authorities cited infra notes 189-91.
188. Leebron, supra note 31, at 170.
189. Id. at 174.
190. Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender, supra note 45, at 929-30; Oesterle, Target Managers
as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis,
71 CORNELL L. REv. 53, 62 (1985).
191. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HA~v. L. REv. 1028,
1039-40 (1982); Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender
Offers, 73 VA. L. REv. 701, 705 n. 7 (1987); Leebron, supra note 31, at 189-91; Oesterle, supra
note 190, at 58-63.
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The bargaining argument appears incompatible with the empirical evidence,
which indicates that target shareholders capture a predominant amount of the
gains associated with takeovers.192 Most recent studies have found either neg-
ligible or negative cumulative abnormal returns to bidding firms in tender
offers. Mitchell and Lehn found a statistically significant abnormal return of
-0.2107o on the date the tender offer was announced, but no returns were
significantly different from zero in any other period after the tender offer
commenced. 93 Magenheim and Mueller found no significant abnormal returns
to bidding firms in tender offers regardless of the baseline price used. 94 Bradley,
Desai, and Kim reported statistically significant positive returns to successful
bidders over the period of 1963-1984, but the amount of those returns was
small, only 0.97%. 19 5 They also found that returns to successful bidders were
decreasing over time.'9 Bidders earned statistically significant positive returns
of 4.09% in 1963-1968, returns insignificant from zero in 1968-1980, and
statistically significant negative returns of -2.9307o in 1981-1984.19 Varaiya
and Ferris report a statistically significant average negative abnormal return
to bidders of -3.9%.19 Using the total excess returns to target shareholders
and bidder shareholders as an approximation of the value created by the
transaction, they calculate that on average the premium offered is 73.8% above
the bidder's break-even point. 199 Varaiya estimates that each successful bidder
loses an average of $83.8 million.2 00 These are not the kinds of returns to
bidders that the bargaining argument supposes. It is difficult to imagine
negotiation resulting in better average results to target shareholders.
Of course, these averages do not mean that individual bidders never gain
in tender offers. Only 46.80% to 57.3% of the acquiring firms in the Mitchell
and Lehn study had negative cumulative abnormal returns. 20 1 Approximately
192. See infra text accompanying notes 193-205.
193. M. MITCHELL & K. LEHN, Do BAD BIDDERS BECOME GOOD TARGETS? 33 (Office of
Economic Analysis, SEC 1988).
194. Magenheim & Mueller, Are Acquiring-Firm Shareholders Better Off After an Acquisition?,
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HosTLE TAKEOVER, supra note 168, at 171,
181.
195. Bradley, Desai & Kim, Synergistic Gains, supra note 167, at 11, Table 2.
196. Id. at 11, 13.
197. Id. For arguments explaining why bidders might overpay in takeovers, see Black, Bidder
Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 623-34 (1989); Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of
Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BusrNESS 197 (1986).
198. Varaiya & Ferris, Overpaying in Corporate Takeovers: The Winner's Curse, FIN. ANALYSTS
J., May-June 1987, at 64, 66. The Varaiya and Ferris study includes both mergers and tender
offers. Magenheim and Mueller find lower bidder returns for mergers than for tender offers,
Magenheim & Mueller, supra note 194, at 181, so the Varaiya & Ferris study may not be directly
comparable.
199. Varaiya & Ferris, supra note 198, at 65.
200. Varaiya, The "Winner's Curse" Hypothesis and Corporate Takeovers, MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 209, 214-15 (1988). The 91 acquisitions Varaiya examines include 51 mergers, id.
at 213, so these results may not be directly comparable to those that look only at tender offers.
201. M. MITCHELL & K. LEIN, supra note 193, at 36. The exact percentage depends on the
period over which cumulative, abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated. Of all bidders, 57.3% had
negative CARs on the announcement date, 50.2% during the period from five days before to one
day after the announcement date, and 46.80 during the period from five days before to 40 days
after the announcement date.
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fifty-eight percent of the acquiring firms in the Varaiya and Ferris study 02
and sixty-seven percent of those in the Varaiya study overpaid.2 3 The average
return figures clustering around zero mask a significant dispersion among
bidders. The cumulative excess returns to the overpayers in the Varaiya and
Ferris study averaged - 14%, whereas the average returns to the 42076 of the
bidders who did not overpay were a positive 13.407o;204 however, positive bidder
returns do not make those tender offers detrimental to target shareholders.
Bidders receive some of the gains associated with some tender offers, but target
shareholders receive some of those gains as well. Varaiya indicates that the
excess returns to target shareholders average $93.5 million and are positive in
eighty-seven percent of all the acquisitions he studied.
20 5
VI. COMPETITION AND BARGAINING POWER
One reason why target shareholder gains might approximate the negotiated
solution is because of competition among bidders. Returns to target shareholders
can be affected both by actual competition and by potential competition. If
there is another potential bidder to whom the target is more valuable, that
other bidder could be expected to come forward with a higher offer rather
than let the first bidder succeed. 2°6 Assume that the pre-offer market price of
the stock is $100 per share. Offeror A makes a tender offer for fifty-one
percent of the stock at a price of $130 per share and announces a cash-out
of the remaining forty-nine percent of the shareholders at a price of $100 per
share. The blended price is approximately $115 per share. Assume, in accordance
with the misvaluation thesis, that for some reason the pre-offer price was
below the true value of the target in the hands of existing management and
that its actual value is $125 per share. The target shareholders would prefer
to reject the below-value offer, but, according to the misvaluation theorists,
they would be coerced to accept the offer; 20 7 however, a competing bidder
would find it profitable to make an offer with a blended price greater than
$115 per share but less than $125 per share. Competition in the market would
dissipate the difference between the true value of the firm and the price offered
to the shareholders until the two-tier, blended price equalled or exceeded the
shares' true value. Even if the company was worth $125 per share only in the
hands of existing management, competition would still exist. Management would
have an incentive to outbid Offeror A by means of a management buyout.
Alternatively, other investors would find it worthwhile to buy the stock and
leave the existing management in power. Competition should drive the bid
price to a point at which shareholders could not rationally expect a higher
202. Varaiya & Ferris, supra note 198, at 65.
203. Varaiya, supra note 200, at 214-15.
204. Varaiya & Ferris, supra note 198, at 66.
205. Varaiya, supra note 200, at 214-15.
206. But cf. D. HIRSHLEIFER & I. PNG, FACILITATION OF COMPETING BIDS AND THE PRICE OF
A TAKEOVER TARGET (U.C.L.A. Graduate School of Management Business Economics Working
Paper #87-10, Dec. 14, 1988) (arguing that, when bidding is costly, the price at which the target
is sold may be well below the minimum of the bidders' valuations less the bidding cost).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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bid.20 8 The Williams Act provides a minimum delay period of twenty business
days for competing bids to arise, 209 and existing management has broad discretion
under existing law to solicit additional bids.210 The Williams Act delay period
is often sufficient to bring forth competing bids, 2 1 and no evidence exists that
it is ever insufficient.
Misvaluation theorists often point to situations in which an initial bid is
rejected and shareholders later receive a higher bid. Three responses are ap-
propriate. First, a later, higher bid is more valuable to target shareholders
only if it exceeds the present value of the initial bid. Because of the delay
between the bids, this is often not the case. Second, the existence of these
situations provides evidence that shareholders are able to reject inadequate
initial bids. Finally, such arguments often fail to account for general price
changes during the time separating the two bids. A superficially higher second
bid may not be higher, in real terms, than the initial bid.
The number of tender offers that involve multiple bidders has increased
although scholars differ as to the exact magnitude of the increase. Bradley,
Desai, and Kim report that the relative frequency of multiple bidder contests
increased from eighteen percent of all offers in 1963-1968, to thirty percent
in 1968-1980, and to forty-six percent in 1981-1984.212 Walkling and Long
report that twelve percent of the cash tender offers they studied in 1972-1977
involved multiple bidders, 2 3 but their methodology probably understates this
number. They classify an offer as multiple-bidder only if an opposing bidder
existed at the time the bidder filed its last bid revision. 2'1 This understates
competition because competitors may drop out before the final bid is made.
Guerin-Calvert, McGuckin, and Warren-Boulton report that the percentage of
multiple bidders rose from 8.5% prior to the Williams Act to 15.15%' after
208. See Leebron, supra note 31, at 194; Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, supra note 84, at 183-84;
Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 307.
209. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1987).
210. Challenges to management's power to seek competing bids, in the absence of any tactics
designed to favor one bid or another, are virtually nonexistent. Takeover cases focus on the validity
of defensive tactics which favor one bidder over another; the ability of management to solicit
competing bids is unquestioned and often implicitly affirmed. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v.
MLSMC Acquisitions, 781 F.2d 264, 274 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that lockup options may be beneficial
to shareholders if they induce competing bids); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1286 (Del. 1988) (noting the benefit of lockout options); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986) (noting the benefit of lockout options); Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 878-80 (Del. 1985) (active solicitation of competing bids might have
excused the directors' failure to make an informed judgment in accepting the buyout offer). Revlon
imposes a duty on directors to get the best possible price once a decision to sell the company is
made. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. The most obvious way to fulfill that duty is to solicit competing
bids.
211. Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender, supra note 45, at 929.
212. Bradley, Desai & Kim, Synergistic Gains, supra note 167, at 29. Bradley, Desai, and
Kim classify a contest as multiple-bidder if a second bidder's name is mentioned in the press and
that bidder engages in at least one of the following activities: "(1) making a formal tender offer
or merger proposal, (2) negotiating a merger possibility with the target management, or (3) announcing
its plans to make a bid." Id.




the Act and rose even higher in states which regulated tender offers. 2 s The
authors of a Note published in the Yale Law Journal studied not only contests
involving multiple bidders, but also contests involving multiple offers by a
single bidder. 21 6 They reported an incidence of multiple bids in the fifteen to
twenty-two percent range and an incidence of auctions in the nine to twenty-
six percent range, depending on the time period and whether the target's state
of incorporation had a second generation takeover statute.
2 7
Each of these studies of competition examined both hostile and friendly
offers. A better measure of competition limited to hostile offers is provided
by Professor Jarrell. 21 8 Professor Jarrell examined offers for 103 targets that
filed lawsuits in response to the offer. 21 9 This presents a good proxy for hostile
offers because the vast majority of hostile offers involve defensive litigation
by the target; the target is unlikely to file a lawsuit in response to an initially
friendly offer. 220 Professor Jarrell found that over sixty-two percent of such
offers involved an "auction," defined as a substantially higher offer by the
same bidder or a competing offer by another bidder. 21 In contrast, only eleven
percent of the nonlitigious targets were involved in auctions. 222 Thus, there
seems to be even greater competition in hostile offers than in friendly offers.
This difference may be more apparent than real because, in friendly deals,
negotiations between bidders and targets can substitute for competitive bid-
ding. 22
3
Bebchuk contends that the initial offeror may have a strate,c advantage
that would inhibit other bids and therefore lower the price paid to target
shareholders. 224 He offers the following example:
[C]onsider a case in which both A, the first bidder, and B, another
potential offeror, value the target . . . [at] . . . SX per share, and
B is aware of A's valuation of the target. A has already incurred
the transaction costs involved in making a tender offer, and now
215. M. GUEIUN-CALVERT, R. McGUCKIN & F. WARREN-BOULTON, STATE AND FEDERAL REG-
ULATION IN THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 18-19 (U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper, 1986).
216. Note, supra note 62, at 1219.
217. The percentage of multiple bids by the same bidder increased from 15.38% to 22.22%
in states that adopted second generation statutes and decreased from 19.05% to 15.38% in states
without second generation statutes. The percentage of auctions (multiple bidders) decreased from
26.92% to 19.44% in states that adopted second generation statutes and increased from 9.5207o to
20.51% in states without second generation statutes. Id.
218. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?,
28 J.L. ECON. 151 (1985).
219. Id. at 160.
220. Professor Rosenzweig found that target lawsuits followed the announcement of the tender
offer in 60 of 95 initially hostile bids in the period from 1982 to 1985. Rosenzweig, Target Litigation,
85 MIcH. L. Rav. 110, 114 (1986). Comparing his data to Jarrell's, he concludes that targets almost
always sue bidders as a defensive response to unwanted offers. Id. at 115. Rosenzweig also quotes
a letter from Jarrell equating litigation with hostility. Id. at 115 n.20.
221. Jarrel, supra note 218, at 160-61.
222. Id.
223. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERS, supra note 48, at 18 (noting
no substantial differences between negotiated and non-negotiated offers in bid premium received).
224. Bebchuk, supra note 191, at 1036 n. 45.
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B is considering whether to make these expenditures and advance
a rival bid. Because the transaction costs involved in A's bid are
sunk, A will be prepared to raise its bid for the target to anything
less than $X per share. Thus, to win a contest over the target, B
will have to bid $X per share in addition to spending the transaction
costs involved in making a bid. Consequently, B's rational decision
will be not to enter into a contest with A, even though B's valuation
of the target is the same as A's. 225
There are two problems with this argument. First, Bebchuk assumes that
the second potential bidder knows the first bidder's valuation of the target.
This is unlikely because the tender offerors' valuations of the target company
are closely guarded and hard to estimate. If B is not aware of A's valuation,
it makes perfect sense for B to bid in the hope that A places a lower value
on the company than B does. Second, Bebchuk assumes that both bidders
place the same value on the target. 226 If B's valuation is higher than A's by
at least the amount of the transaction costs involved in making a second bid,
B would bid even if B knows A's valuation.
The empirical evidence shows that, on average, the best proposal wins
when competition arises. A study conducted by the Office of the Chief Econ-
omist of the SEC concluded, contrary to the arguments of some scholars, 227
that during the 1981-1984 time period surveyed, "no (non-negotiated) partial
or two-tier tender offer beat any (unenjoined) any-or-all tender offer or merger
proposal offering a higher premium. ' 22 Professor Ruback found that, in most
of the forty-eight multiple bidder tender offers which he studied, the unsuc-
cessful bidder could not have outbid the winning bidder without a loss to the
unsuccessful bidder. 229 In twenty-nine of the contests that he studied, a higher
offer unambiguously would have caused a loss to the unsuccessful bidder;230
however, if it was assumed that the market believed that the probability of
the initial bid's success was greater than fifty percent, a higher offer in an
additional twelve cases would have caused a loss to the unsuccessful bidder. 23'
The initial positive abnormal return to the unsuccessful bidder would have
justified a higher offer than the successful bidder's offer in only seven cases. 23 2
Failure to observe more than one bidder in contests for control does not
necessarily mean that shareholders are receiving a lower price in an uncom-
petitive market. The threat of competition may have forced the lone bidder
to make a pre-emptive bid high enough to make an offer unprofitable to
potential competitors. A high-valuing bidder has an incentive to make a high
225. Bebchuk, supra note 191, at 1036 n.45; accord, Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs,
supra note 128, at 370-72.
226. See supra text accompanying note 225.
227. See Lederman, Tender Offer Bidding Strategy, 17 REv. SEC. REG. 917 (1984); Prentice,
supra note 30, at 398.
228. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OrFERs, supra note 48, at 22-23.
229. Ruback, Assessing Competition in the Market for Corporate Acquisitions, 11 J. FIN.
EcON. 141, 150-52 (1983).
230. Id. at 150.
231. Id. at 151.
232. Id. at 150.
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initial pre-emptive bid to discourage competition, avoid the transaction costs
of a bidding war, and encourage shareholders not to hold out. 233 An actual
opposing bid would arise only when the first bidder's offer was too low.
The evidence on this question is mixed. Bradley, Desai, and Kim found
that the average initial abnormal returns to target shareholders were approx-
imately equal in situations in which another person later bid and those in
which no other bidder came forward. 234 As Bradley, Desai, and Kim point
out, "[t]hese findings are not consistent with the alternative hypothesis that
multiple-bidder contests arise because the initial bid was too low."12"1 In his
study of litigious targets, however, Jarrell found that those targets ultimately
involved in an auction received significantly lower initial premiums than those
which received only a single bid. 236 He concludes that "[tlhe lack of auctions
for this latter group could be caused in part by the higher initial premiums,
which would deter potential competition from other bidders. ' 2317 One possible
explanation of the difference in these studies is that Jarrell, focusing on litigious
targets, is looking only at initially hostile bids whereas Bradley, Desai, and
Kim include friendly deals. Prior negotiation of friendly offers may raise returns
to a competitive level before the bid is announced whether or not another bid
is made. Given the greater number of negotiated offers, the effect of low bids
in hostile offers could be masked.
238
The empirical studies also disagree as to the effect of competition on
target shareholder returns. Bradley, Desai, and Kim find that the cumulative
abnormal returns to target shareholders after forty days are almost twenty
percent higher in multiple-bidder contests than in single-bidder contests. 23 9 They
admit that some of this difference may result from timing differences between
the two categories. 240 Nevertheless, they conclude, "Clearly, target shareholders
earn greater returns from multiple-bidder contests than from single-bidder
offers." ' 241 This is also consistent with their finding that bidders' shareholders
earn higher returns in single-bidder offers than in multiple-bidder contests.
212
Regression results of both Walkling and Long, and Varaiya and Ferris also
233. D. HIRSHLEIFER & S. TiTmAN, SHARE TENDERING STRATEGIES AND THE SUCCESS OF HOSTILE
TAKEOVER BIDS (U.C.L.A. Graduate School of Management Business Economics Working Paper
No. 88-8, July 13, 1988); Fishman, A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding, 19 RAND J. ECONOMICS
88 (1988); Schwartz, supra note 146, at 173-74.
234. Bradley, Desai & Kim, Synergistic Gains, supra note 167, at 22.
235. Id. at 22.
236. Jarrell, supra note 218, at 165.
237. Id.
238. Another possibility lies in their respective definitions of competition. Jarrell's definition
of auction includes both multiple bidders and multiple bids by a single bidder. The definition of
Bradley, Desai, and Kim includes only multiple bidder offers; however, Bradley, Desai, and Kim
report that changing the focus to the number of bids rather than the number of bidders does not
significantly affect their results. Bradley, Desai & Kim, Synergistic Gains, supra note 167, at 20
n.17.
239. Id. at 21, Table 3.
240. They find a drop in the price of any outstanding target shares after the execution of
the tender offer. Since 73% of single-bidder bids are executed within the 40-day period, but only
44% of multiple-bidder contests, the differences on day 40 may in part reflect this post-execution
drop. Id. at 22 n. 18.
241. Id. at 22.
242. Id. at 29.
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indicate substantial shareholder gains from competition. Walkling and Long
found that premiums average 33.5% higher in multiple-bidder contests. 243 Varaiya
and Ferris found that the presence of multiple bidders was associated with a
statistically significant 26.5% increase in premiums; 2" however, the presence
of other bidders had no significant connection to the amount of overpayment
by the bidder. 2' Jarrell also found gains in auction situations as the auctions
developed, but these gains merely cancelled out the initial disparity he found
between auction and non-auction initial bids, leaving the auction and single-
bid portfolios relatively equal. 246 In addition, a regression by Pound, which
examined the relationship between premiums and the number of bidders, found
only a marginally significant, relatively unimportant effect. 247
The argument that shareholders are coerced into accepting unprofitable,
below-value tender offers also disregards the presence of institutional investors
and arbitrageurs, who purchase substantial positions from existing shareholders
after the tender offer is made. Large institutional owners hold sufficient blocks
of stock in major corporations to prevent a takeover, or at least make one
very difficult. In a 1987 sample of New York Stock Exchange securities, it
was found that pension funds, mutual funds, and other institutional investors
owned a majority in thirty-eight percent of the firms and owned more than
forty percent of the securities in fifty-eight percent of the firms; 248 furthermore,
the number of pension funds, mutual funds, and other institutional investors
is few enough that a coordinated response to an unwanted tender offer is
possible. In most cases, twenty or fewer funds make up those percentages. 249
The largest holders have both the incentive and the power to respond forcefully
to takeovers. In large corporations, the largest institutional holder often owns
more than five percent of the stock, and the five largest institutional holders
usually own more than ten percent. 2 0 Some studies have found that institutional
ownership is lower on average for target firms than for the market as a
whole. 25 These numbers are misleading because purchases by arbitrageurs,
when tender offers are made, increase the power of the large owners. Frequently,
243. Walkling & Long, supra note 62, at 60-61. This result is significant at the 0.10 level.
244. Varaiya & Ferris, supra note 198, at 67.
245. Id. at 67-68; accord, Varaiya, supra note 200, at 215-16.
246. Jarrell, supra note 218, at 167-69.
247. J. POUND, supra note 57, at 11-12, 21.
248. Conard, The Voice of the Funds, L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Winter 1989, at 31, 32 (1989).
249. Id.
250. As of 1969, in 125 companies with a market value exceeding $500 million, the largestinstitutional holder owned 5%o or more of the stock in 44.8% of the companies; the five largest
institutional investors owned 10% or more in 72.0% of the companies. E. HERMAN, CORPORATE
CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 141-42 (1981). For companies with a market value in the $100-249
million range, the equivalent percentages were 43.2% and 58.5%. Id. Shleifer and Vishny surveyed
456 of the Fortune 500 companies for 1980 and found that 354 of them had at least one shareholder
who owned 5%o or more of the firm. Shleifer & Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,
94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 462 (1986). The average holding for the largest shareholder was 15.4%, and
the average holding of the five largest shareholders was 28.8%. Id.
251. Professor Pound found that a sample of 100 takeover targets had an average institutional
ownership of 22.2% compared to the market average of 35%. J. POUND, supra note 57, at 5. A
study by the Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC found similar results. The average institutional
ownership in 177 target firms was 19.3% compared to an average of 33.7% for industry control
groups. OFFICE OF TiH CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, supra note 95, at 10.
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institutions and arbitrageurs end up with more than fifty percent of the target
"and thus have the ability to determine its destiny. ' 25 2 Arbitrageurs serve a
valuable risk-taking function, allowing risk averse shareholders to sell at a
favorable price without incurring the risk that the tender offer will not succeed.
253
They also help protect against coercion of the target's shareholders. The coercion
argument is premised on the inability of target shareholders to coordinate their
response and negotiate with the offeror. Arbitrageurs, in concert with insti-
tutional investors, have much greater bargaining power and much lower costs
of coordination and cooperation. 2 4 Their cooperative response to tender offers
makes coercion less likely.
255
Pound found no significant relationship between the size of takeover
premiums or the defeat of takeovers and the level of institutional ownership;
25 6
however, this result is difficult to interpret. It may be that a high level of
institutional ownership does not correct for any coercion problem, or it may
be that there is no remaining coercion problem for institutional ownership to
protect against. It is also possible that Pound focuses on the wrong statistic.
What is important for bargaining purposes is not the level of institutional
ownership prior to the takeover but the level of ownership of both institutions
and arbitrageurs during the takeover. If, when a takeover occurs, arbitrageurs
and institutions buy a large percentage of the stock of companies with low
institutional ownership, there really is no difference in terms of bargaining
power. The evidence indicates that the size of the tender offer bid premium
has a significant, positive influence on the outcome of the bid.25 7 Far from
being coerced, target shareholders seem quite able to reject two-tier offers
when they want. Only 47.4% of all two-tier offers initiated in 1978-1984
succeeded, as opposed to 74.2% of any-or-all offers. 258 These results make
sense only if target shareholders have some meaningful bargaining power and
can reject unfavorable bids.
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the invalidity of the argument that
target shareholders are unfairly treated or coerced in hostile takeovers. Although
252. Lipton, supra note 4, at 114.
253. Gilson, supra note 52, at 855-56; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 72, at 1744.
254. There are a smaller number of such investors, and each has a large stake in the outcome,
which makes collective action more likely. See M. OLsoN, supra note 33.
255. Professor Bebchuk's arguments on this point are somewhat inconsistent. He argues that
the intervention of arbitrageurs and other buyers should not matter because, no matter how many
times the shares change hands, whoever holds them at the moment of truth is faced with the same
coerced decision. Bebchuk, supra note 14, at 1727. In an earlier work, however, he admitted that
the existence of large shareholders who could take into account the effect of their tender decision
on the success of the offer would strengthen the bargaining position of the target's shareholders.
Bebchuk, supra note 191, at 1040.
256. J. POUND, supra note 57, at 7-14.
257. Walkling & Long, supra note 62, at 61-62.
258. Takeover Tactics and Public Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommuni-
cations, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 311 (1984) (written statement of Robert Greenhill, Managing Director, Morgan
Stanley & Co.).
1990]
The Journal of Corporation Law
there may be a few such cases, the great majority of hostile tender offers
result in large gains to target shareholders. The argument made so far assumes
the existing legal and structural regime without describing what that regime is
or how it affects target shareholders. It might be argued that target shareholder
returns are high only because management resistance or state antitakeover
statutes force bidders to compensate target shareholders fairly. The evidence
presented earlier in this Article might be seen as a reaffirmation of the value
of such defensive tactics rather than proof that the unrestricted tender offer
process works. Although this Article does not discuss fully the arguments
against management resistance or state takeover statutes, a brief look suffices
to cast doubt on the idea that these tactics are causing target shareholder
gains.
A. Target Management Resistance
Many of the available studies show that opposition by target management
has no significant effect on the premiums paid to target shareholders. In the
tender offers studied by Walkling and Long, bid premiums were 48.8°7o in
uncontested offers and 45.507o in contested offers.2 9 In a multiple regression,
Walkling and Long found no significant relationship between target management
opposition and bid premiums. 260 The SEC's Office of the Chief Economist
and Comment and Jarrell similarly found no significant differences between
the average blended premiums in negotiated and unnegotiated offers. 26' Comment
and Jarrell concluded that, "[i]gnoring partial offers, . . . the shareholder
wealth effects of tender offers do not materially depend on whether the offer
is . . .negotiated or unnegotiated, either initially or at execution. ' 262
Professor Jarrell, in his study of litigious targets, found a much higher
percentage of auctions for litigious targets than for uncontested offers-sixty-
two percent versus eleven percent. 263 These auctions produced a substantial
seventeen percentage point gain over the abnormal returns associated with the
initial offer; 26 however, these gains appear to result from the competition
inherent in an auction rather than from management resistance. When no
auction developed, management resistance caused no substantial change in the
abnormal returns associated with the offer. 265 Jarrell found auctions occurring
when the initial bid was low, 266 and it seems probable that target management
resistance is more likely to develop in these low bid cases. One cannot definitely
say that management resistance creates the auction. Viewed in this light, Jarrell's
finding is simply consistent with the Walkling and Long finding that competing
bids were associated with higher premiums. 267 Management resistance may have
259. Walkling & Long, supra note 62, at 63.
260. Id. at 60.
261. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, TENDER OFFERs, supra note 48, at 18, Table 4c;
Comment & Jarrell, supra note 55, at 297.
262. Comment & Jarrell, supra note 55, at 299.
263. Jarrell, supra note 218, at 161.
264. Id. at 165-71.
265. Id. at 167.
266. Id.
267. See Walkling & Long, supra note 62, at 60.
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little to do with it. A similar problem affects the Lipton and Steinberger
observation that, in fifty-one percent of all contested offers, the target is
eventually acquired by the original bidder or a white knight at a higher price
than the initial bid. 268 Without a comparative statistic indicating what happened
in uncontested offers, this percentage is virtually meaningless.
Even if management opposition produces higher premiums for target
shareholders in some cases, there are countervailing considerations. The possibility
of management opposition, by lowering the probability of a successful offer
and raising the cost of the offer, would undoubtedly deter some positive-value
takeovers from occuring. 269 Jensen and Ruback hypothesize that any higher
average returns associated with management resistance could merely be the
product of the reduced incidence of offers:
For example, the higher returns could arise because only the more
highly profitable takeovers are pursued when bidders believe
managerial opposition will lower the probability of success and raise
the expected costs. If managerial opposition simply raises costs, bids
will be lower than they would be otherwise and low profit takeovers
would not occur .... [T]his truncation of the distribution of takeovers
would raise the measured average profitability of manager-opposed
takeovers .270
For the same reason, management opposition makes a hostile tender offer less
likely to succeed. Walkling and Long found a statistically significant negative
relationship between management opposition and the success of a takeover
bid. 27' The average success rate for offers they studied that were contested by
target management was thirty-seven percent, compared to eighty-eight percent
for uncontested offers. 272 Similarly, although the twenty-one contested offers
at which Kummer and Hoffmeister looked offered higher premiums than the
uncontested offers, fifteen of those had not been completed within ten months
of the offer. 2
73
Target shareholders obviously do not gain if a beneficial offer is never
made or fails. Studies by Professors Dodd, Ruback, and Yen have found
evidence even more damaging to the proposition that managerial resistance
creates shareholder gains. Professor Ruback found that the announcement that
a corporate control contest was being unsuccessfully terminated resulted in a
two-day abnormal loss of 10.69%.274 Abnormal returns were negative in ninety-
one percent of the cases he studied. He concluded that "the significant stock
268. M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, I TAKEOVERS AND FREEzEouTs 1-8 (1988).
269. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. Rav. 1161, 1174-82, 1188-90 (1981). Easterbrook and Fischel's
conclusion that all resistance by target management should be prohibited has been strongly challenged
by others. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 191; Gilson, supra note 52; Oesterle, supra note 191.
270. Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J.
FIN. EcON. 5, 37 (1983).
271. Walkling & Long, supra note 62, at 62.
272. Id. at 63.
273. Kummer & Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers, 33 J. FINANcE
505 (1978).
274. Ruback, supra note 229, at 150-52.
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price decline at the termination announcement suggests that the expected value
of the failure is negative and therefore not in the interests of the existing
stockholders." 27 5 Professor Dodd studied 151 merger proposals during the period
of 1971-1977 and found that target managements' termination of such proposals
resulted in a two-day abnormal return to shareholders of -5.53%0.276 In a
study of merger proposals during the period of 1971-1980, Professor Yen found
that when the target's management accepted the proposal, the average wealth
gains to shareholders were significantly higher than the gains experienced by
shareholders in those cases in which management rejected the proposal. 277
Average abnormal returns were 38.92% for the accepting group and only
11.34% for the rejecting group. 278 Furthermore, when Yen looked at the value
target shareholders would have received if the merger had been accepted, he
found that it was a statistically significant 3.2 times greater than the actual
returns when management rejected the proposal. 279 He concludes: "The
comparisons suggest that shareholders would realize a larger wealth gain had
the rejected merger proposals been accepted. The results suggest that top
managers are engaged in wealth-reducing resistance. ' 2 0 Thus, the net effect
of management resistance is indeterminate, even if it does result in higher
premiums.
These general results hold when poison pills, one of the most popular
and effective forms of target defense, are examined separately. Malatesta and
Walkling studied 132 firms adopting poison pill defenses in the period 1982-
1986.21 They found statistically significant abnormal stock price returns of
from - 0.9% to - 1.3% when such plans were announced. This represents a
wealth loss to shareholders of $21 million to $29 million. 282 The abnormal loss
was even greater-2.3 %-when they limited their inquiry to firms already
subject to takeover bids. 283 Ryngaert found that the adoption of poison pill
plans had no significant effect on stock prices across his sample of 380 firms;28 4
however, when such plans were adopted by firms already subject to takeover
speculation for which there were no confounding events, the announcement
of poison pills resulted in a statistically significant abnormal loss of 1.5170.285
Ryngaert also found that market prices reacted to court decisions upholding
or invalidating poison pills.286 Pro-management decisions were accompanied by
a statistically significant average excess return of -2.23% compared to a
275. Id. at 150.
276. Dodd, Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth, 8 J. FIN.
EcoN. 105, 125 (1980).
277. Yen, Merger Proposals, Managerial Discretion, and Magnitude of Shareholders' Wealth
Gains, 39 J. EcoN. & Bus. 251, 258 (1987).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 262.
280. Id.
281. Malatesta & Walkling, Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth, Profitability, and
Ownership Structure, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 347 (1988).
282. Id. at 360.
283. Id. at 362.
284. Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. FIN. EcoN.
377, 391 (1988).
285. Id. at 392.
286. Id. at 404-05.
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positive average excess return of 3.36076 for pro-bidder decisions. 2 7 Finally,
contrary to prevailing notions, Ryngaert found that increased bids were less
likely for targets with poison pills.288 Increased bids occurred in 51.8% of the
cases in which target management had adopted poison pills compared to 68.4%
of the control group cases. 28 9 Tender offers were also twice as likely to be
defeated when the target had a poison pill. 290 All offers were defeated in 31%
of the cases when the target had a poison pill, but only 15.8% of the control
group targets defeated all offers.
29
'
At best, the empirical evidence on managerial resistance justifies a limited
management response designed to promote competition and increase the amount
of the offer. It would support a value-enhancement rule such as that proposed
by Professor Gilson.292 It would not support scorched earth tactics or unlimited
use of poison pills and other offer-barring devices.
2 93
B. Antitakeover Regulation
The gains to target shareholders might also be attributed to state and
federal regulation. The federal Williams Act has undoubtedly increased the
average premiums paid in tender offers. Jarrell and Bradley found that average
cash tender premiums increased from thirty-two percent before the Williams
Act to between fifty-three percent and seventy-three percent after the Act
depending on whether the target was also subject to state regulation.2 94 Guerin-
Calvert, McGuckin, and Warren-Boulton found similar increases, from forty
percent premiums before the enactment of the Williams Act to an average of
sixty-one percent after the Act. 291 Jarrell and Bradley observed similar increases
in cumulative abnormal returns after the passage of the Williams Act.2 96 Guerin-
Calvert, McGuckin, and Warren-Boulton provide evidence that the Williams
Act also may have increased the level of competition in takeover contests.
There were multiple bidders in 15.1% of the takeover offers after the enactment
of the Williams Act, compared to 8.5% before the Act. 297 The Williams Act,
and particularly the 1970 amendments strengthening the Act, however, also
appear to be associated with a general decrease in takeover activity.
298
287. Id. at 405.
288. Id. at 408.
289. Id. at 407.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See Gilson, supra note 52, at 865-75, 878-79.
293. A recent Delaware Chancery Court opinion illustrates how such a value-enhancement rule
might be drawn with respect to poison pills. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco,
Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 799-800 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that the target's defensive recapitalization was
not a reasonable response to the hostile bidder's all-cash tender offer).
294. Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender
Offers, 23 J. L. EcoN. 371, 389 (1980).
295. M. GUERIN-CALVERT, R. McGUCKIN & F. WARREN-BOULTON, supra note 215, at 18.
296. Cumulative, abnormal returns over the period from 40 days before the offer to 80 days
after the offer averaged 20.4% prior to the Williams Act, 32.8% after the Williams Act for targets
not subject to state regulation, and 35.3% after the Williams Act for targets subject to state
regulation. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 294, at 389.
297. M. GUERIN-CALVERT, R. McGUCKIN & F. WARREN-BOULTON, supra note 215, at 18.
298. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 294, at 399-400.
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These studies also show that state legislation had a positive effect on
returns to target shareholders. Post-Williams Act premiums were approximately
twenty percentage points higher for targets subject to state takeover regulation
than for non-regulated targets, a statistically significant difference. 299 Competition
among bidders was also more likely for regulated targets. After the enactment
of the Williams Act, there were multiple bidders in 13.5% of the offers for
targets not subject to state tender offer regulation and in 17.6% of the offers
for regulated targets.3°°
One might be tempted to conclude from these studies that state regulation
of takeovers is efficacious in protecting target shareholders; however, Jarrell
and Bradley also found evidence that state tender offer laws moderately reduced
the frequency of tender offers.3 °0 It is more important that both of these
studies covered a period before the United States Supreme Court significantly
restricted state antitakeover statutes in Edgar v. MITE Corp.3 0 2 The Jarrell
and Bradley study involved offers during the period of 1962-1977, 03 and the
Guerin-Calvert, McGuckin, and Warren-Boulton study involved offers during
the period of 1962-1980. 3o4 The state statutes at issue were therefore predominantly
of the first generation, merit review type, now unconstitutional under MITE. o0
Evidence of the effect of second generation statutes on shareholder returns
is much less favorable. 3°6 A recent study in the Yale Law Review found no
statistically significant difference in the average premiums offered for firms
covered by second generation statutes compared to firms not covered by these
statutes.30 7 Although the percentage of multiple bids by the same bidder increased
in states with second generation statutes, the percentage of auctions (multiple
bidders) decreased. 08 The total percentages of targets experiencing multiple
bids or auctions declined from 42.3107o to 41.67% in states adopting second
generation statutes and grew from 28.57% to 35.9% in states without such
statutes. 309 Companies subject to control share statutes fared particularly poorly. 310
Finally, the adoption of these statutes apparently had a negative effect on the
299. Post-Williams Act premiums were approximately 53% for targets that were not subject
to state tender offer regulation and 730o for regulated targets. M. GuERiN-CALVERT, R. McGUCKN
& F. WARREN-BOUrTON, supra note 215, at 17-18; Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 294, at 389-90.
The differences were statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the Jarrell and Bradley study and
at the 0.05 level in the other study.
300. M. GUERIN-CALVERT, R. McGUCKIN & F. WARREN-BOULTON, supra note 215, at 18-19.
301. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 294, at 401-02.
302. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
303. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 294, at 388.
304. M. GuE iN-CAI.VERT, R. McGuCKIN AND F. WARREN-BOULTON, supra note 215, at 16.
305. Edger v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982).
306. For a general review of a typical state takeover statute and its effects, see Bradford,
supra note 1.
307. Note, supra note 62, at 1220-21. The difference, although not significant, favored states
without second generation statutes, where premiums averaged 50.8907o, over states with second
generation statutes, where premiums averaged 47.760o.
308. Id. at 1219. The percentage of multiple bids increased from 15.38% to 22.22% in states
that adopted second generation statutes and declined from 19.05076 to 15.38% in states without
such statutes. The percentage of auctions declined from 26.92% to 19.44% in states that adopted





number of takeover offers made. The number of takeover attempts increased
by only thirty-eight percent after the adoption of state antitakeover statutes
while increasing almost eighty-six percent over a comparable period in those
states which did not adopt these statutes.3 ' This difference persisted when
adjusted for the number of publicly-traded firms in each state.31 2 If the Yale
study is accepted, second generation state statutes offer only grief to target
shareholders. They do not increase premiums, they do not increase competitive
bidding, and they reduce the number of offers being made. With protection
like this, shareholders may long for the days of "coercion".
Studies of the effect on stock prices of the introduction and adoption of
these statutes provide further evidence of the negative effects of such statutes
on target shareholders. Schumann studied the reaction of the stock prices of
ninety-four New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange firms
to two proposed New York takeover bills. The first bill was a control share
statute that also provided redemption rights, and the second bill was the present
five-year prohibition on business combinations with interested persons.3 '3
Schumann found an insignificant negative abnormal return associated with the
announcement of the first proposal but a statistically significant positive return
of 0.76% when the governor vetoed the bill.31 4 He found a statistically significant
negative abnormal return of -0.97% associated with the announcement of
the second bill, representing a capital loss to shareholders of approximately
$1.2 billion." '
Ryngaert and Netter examined the effect of antitakeover legislation in
Ohio on the stock prices of thirty-seven firms incorporated in Ohio. 1 6 They
found statistically significant negative cumulative abnormal returns of - 1.94%
to -3.48% depending on the time window used. 311 This represents a dollar
loss to these firms' shareholders of from $750 million to $1.5 billion s.3 1 The
most favorable evidence for such statutes is provided by Professor Romano,
who found no statistically significant effects, positive or negative, associated
with the introduction and approval of takeover legislation in Connecticut,
Missouri, and Pennsylvania. 31 9 In conclusion, the empirical research provides
almost no evidence to support second generation state takeover statutes as a
means to further the interests of target shareholders.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. L. SCHUMANN, STATE REGULATION OF TAKEOVERS AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: THE EFFECTS
OF NEW YORK'S 1985 TAKEOVER STATUTES (Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade
Commission, March 1987).
314. Id. at 33.
315. Id. at 39.
316. Ryngaert & Netter, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law, 4 J. L.
EcON. & ORGANIZATION 373 (1988). See also OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, SHAREHOLDER
WEALTH EFFECTS OF OHIo LEGISLATION AFFECTING TAKEOVERS (1987) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS].
317. Ryngaert & Netter, supra note 316, at 380.
318. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS, supra note 316,
at 17.
319. Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 182-86
(1987).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Whatever the reason for the huge gains to target shareholders in hostile
tender offers, one thing is clear. The myth of target shareholder mistreatment
in takeovers is as unfounded as the myths of the tooth fairy, Santa Claus,
and the Easter bunny.3 20 Target shareholders are the clear winners in the
corporate takeover game. There may be other reasons for further regulation
of hostile takeovers, but protection of target shareholders is not one of them.
No further restrictions are needed on their behalf. From the standpoint of the
target shareholder, the present avalanche of state statutes has gone too far.
Policymakers and academics should recognize that the myth of the stampeding
shareholder is entertaining but untrue.
320. With apologies to Jason, Allison, John, and Anne Bradford, -should any of them ever
read this.
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